Concurrent Inspections of BOP Food Service Operations
Report Number: 25-062 | Date Posted: June 17, 2025 | Division: Evaluation & Inspections | Print this page

Between Tuesday, June 4, and Thursday, June 6, 2024, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted a series of unannounced, concurrent inspections assessing the administration of food service at six Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) institutions, one in each of the BOP’s six regions:
- Mid-Atlantic Region—U.S. Penitentiary (USP) McCreary in Pine Knot, Kentucky;
- Southeast Region—Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Marianna in Marianna, Florida;
- South Central Region—Federal Correctional Complex (FCC) Pollock in Pollock, Louisiana;
- North Central Region—Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) Chicago in Chicago, Illinois;
- Northeast Region—FCC Allenwood in Allenwood, Pennsylvania; and
- Western Region—FCI Mendota in Mendota, California.
The DOJ OIG’s Inspections Program
The DOJ OIG has determined that it can enhance the effectiveness of its oversight, and its ability to alert the BOP to concerns, by conducting short notice and unannounced inspections of BOP institutions. Since 2023, the OIG has conducted such inspection visits at 13 BOP institutions, including those discussed in this product.
The OIG has released the results of its completed prior inspections, which include FCI Waseca, FCI Tallahassee, FCI Sheridan, FCI Lewisburg, and Federal Medical Center Devens; its inspection work on Federal Detention Center SeaTac and USP Canaan is ongoing.
We focused these inspections on the administration of food service given the serious food service-related issues we identified during prior inspections.
Prior Findings in BOP Food Service
Most concerningly, during our inspection of FCI Tallahassee we observed moldy bread served to inmates, rotting vegetables in a food preparation refrigerator, a food warehouse with insects inside and on top of food, damaged and warped containers of food, and likely evidence of rodent droppings and rodents having chewed through food packaging. Additionally, at FCI Tallahassee and during prior inspections of other institutions, we identified a variety of issues impairing the administration of food service.
As outlined in Appendix 1, at the six institutions we inspected, we toured the institutions and observed operations throughout, including the kitchen, the freezers and coolers, the food preparation areas, the dining areas (dining halls and satellite feeding locations), the food service infrastructure, and the food storage warehouses. We also observed meal preparation and service. Additionally, we interviewed institution leadership, line staff, and inmates regarding food service and food service infrastructure.
Our inspections identified a wide range of food service conditions and operations at the six institutions. As we detail below, the food service operations at some institutions appeared to be well run, were generally clean, and had few if any serious issues identified; others had significant problems in multiple areas; the remaining institutions fell somewhere in between. At several of the institutions we inspected, we observed failures to maintain security and accountability for kitchen knives, the inability to x-ray pallets of food entering the institution for contraband because the facility’s x-ray machines were broken, an absence of cameras in food warehouses, Food Service Department staff shortages, and unaddressed repairs in food service areas.
Ultimately, many of the issues we observed are manifestations of longstanding BOP-wide issues the OIG has previously identified, including ineffective contraband mitigation, insufficient security camera coverage, staff shortages, and failing infrastructure. The DOJ OIG’s body of BOP oversight work has previously identified these as significant enterprise-wide challenges for the BOP and those prior reports contain recommendations on each of these topics for corrective action by the BOP. This product highlights how those existing findings and recommendations relate to the food service operations at the six institutions we inspected. We also identified several other serious concerns specific to food service operations including the malfunctioning of major food storage equipment, sanitation failures, and workplace safety issues.
Although we did not identify food quality and food safety issues as egregious as those found at FCI Tallahassee, the issues identified through this project presented concerning risks to both food safety and workplace safety, as well as the general security of some of the inspected institutions. See below for further details on our observations and findings.
Nationwide View
The interactive map below shows the six institutions we inspected within their respective BOP regions. Click on each pin for more details on an institution.
Overview of Significant Findings
Please expand the collapsible content below for an overview of the significant findings from our inspections.
CONTRABAND
OIG work has consistently found that BOP employees do not always follow established correctional policies and procedures to detect and intercept contraband that poses a direct risk of inmate self-harm or violence that could result in death. During our food service inspections, we similarly found lax enforcement of contraband mitigation procedures. For example:
- At USP McCreary, we found a large unattended and untethered knife in a food preparation area. This is a direct violation of BOP policy, which states that knives must be under the direct supervision of employees and tethered to a stationary object if they are to be used in unsecure food service areas. Additionally, a BOP employee told us that when the knife is not in use it is stored in an unlocked desk drawer, as opposed to a locked cabinet as required by BOP policy.
- At FCI Marianna, we found that employees were not appropriately tracking the use of two knives and five other sharp tools.
- At FCC Pollock, we found that multiple keys had been issued for a secure knife cabinet, although BOP policy states that only one key should be issued to ensure employee and inmate safety.
- FCI Mendota and FCI Marianna did not have functional pallet x-ray machines to detect possible contraband in large food shipments being brought into the institution. Based on our discussions with food service staff, it is likely that neither institution has had a functional pallet x-ray machine for at least 2 years prior to our inspection. In response to a draft of this product, the BOP stated that BOP policy does not require the use of pallet x-ray machines and noted that institutions do not rely solely on them to examine incoming food shipments for contraband, as they use manual searches as a supplemental search technique. Notwithstanding the value of manual searches, we believe that pallet x-ray machines can still assist the BOP in preventing the introduction of contraband.
- At FCC Allenwood, inmates routinely diverted large volumes of food and hid it, for personal use, in drop ceilings.
Reference to Previous Work
In June 2016 the OIG reported on the BOP’s Contraband Interdiction Efforts and made recommendations to address weaknesses, including in contraband tracking capabilities. The OIG closed the last open recommendation from that report in November 2024. Additionally, in a June 2014 report on the Procurement of X-Ray Equipment, the OIG identified significant concerns about the BOP’s sole reliance on the x-ray machines that it had purchased because of limitations on their ability to identify contraband. In that report, we recommended that the BOP consider conducting periodic and unannounced external testing of the effectiveness of using pallet x-ray machines to prevent the introduction of contraband. As of January 2015, the OIG had closed all recommendations in that report. Given the scope of this food service product, we did not determine the extent to which the BOP was testing the effectiveness of the pallet x-ray machines across all of its institutions, including the six we visited. However, the inoperability of these machines at FCI Marianna and FCI Mendota indicates that the BOP’s approach to using pallet x-ray machines to combat contraband introduction is an area that continues to merit attention from the BOP.
STAFFING SHORTAGES
Previous OIG oversight products have extensively reported that staffing shortages and employee allocation are among the chief and long-standing operational challenges that affect safety and security at BOP institutions. Consistent with that reporting, we identified staffing challenges in the Food Service Departments at all six institutions we inspected. For example:Although there were Food Service Department staffing shortages at all institutions, they were particularly pronounced at FCI Marianna and FCI Mendota which were well below authorized levels. These shortages made it difficult for employees to safely monitor inmates and caused FCI Mendota to modify the way food is served.
Reference to Previous Work
As result of past reporting by the U.S. Government Accountability Office and the OIG, both agencies have made high-priority recommendations to the BOP to implement a reliable method for calculating staffing levels at BOP institutions. In response, the BOP developed a staffing projection tool which was implemented in October 2024. As of the publication of this food service inspection product, the OIG’s recommendation remains open as the OIG continues to monitor implementation of the tool.
SECURITY CAMERAS
The OIG has repeatedly identified deficiencies, including an insufficient number of cameras, in the BOP’s security camera systems that affect safety and security across BOP institutions. Although the BOP has made progress in updating camera systems and adding cameras at its institutions, of the six institutions we inspected, five (USP McCreary, FCI Marianna, FCC Pollock, MCC Chicago, and FCC Allenwood) did not have security cameras inside food storage warehouses. This is concerning because in three of these institutions BOP inmates routinely work in these large areas. In response to a draft of this product, the BOP told us that BOP policy does not require the presence of cameras in food service warehouses, which are generally outside facility perimeters and that inmates permitted to work in food service warehouses are minimum-security inmates who routinely live and work with limited supervision, in accordance with security level guidelines and local procedures.
Reference to Previous Work
In a June 2016 report on the BOP’s Contraband Interdiction Efforts, we found that ‘‘deficiencies within the BOP’s security camera system have affected the OIG’s ability to secure prosecutions of employees and inmates in BOP contraband introduction cases. These same problems adversely affect the availability of critical evidence to support administrative or disciplinary action against employees and inmates.” Following the issuance of our 2016 report, the BOP began a multiyear update to cameras at 45 institutions; however, serious issues with the BOP’s security camera systems remained. In October 2021, we issued a Management Advisory Memorandum finding that the BOP’s camera systems continued to need significant infrastructure and equipment upgrades and that the BOP lacked a comprehensive strategic plan to address the significant deficiencies of its institution camera systems. As a result of our finding from the 2021 Management Advisory Memorandum, we recommended that the BOP develop a comprehensive strategic plan for transitioning to a fully digital security camera system. As of the publication of this food service inspection product, this recommendation remains open while the BOP continues implementing those upgrades.
In response to a draft of this product, the BOP stated that as of March 2025 it had installed fiber optics in 109 of its 121 institutions and that those institutions are in the process of installing digital cameras. The remaining institutions are in the process of completing fiber optic installation. Additionally, the BOP has obligated $175 million toward the purchase and installation of over 27,000 cameras, fiber installation, and system upgrades at all institutions. Further, the BOP stated that, pending the availability of appropriations and the absence of supply chain disruptions, remaining camera upgrade work will be completed in the next 2 years. According to the BOP, this timeline would be compliant with the timelines prescribed in the Prison Camera Reform Act of 2021, which requires the BOP Director to ensure that BOP institutions have security camera coverage and capabilities necessary to ensure the documentation and accessibility of video evidence pertaining to misconduct, maltreatment, or criminal activity within correctional facilities.
INFRASTRUCTURE
The OIG has routinely reported on infrastructure issues affecting the operation of BOP institutions. During the six inspections that resulted in this product, we observed how infrastructure issues can affect food service operations. For example:
- Due to broken water pipes and poor drainage that damaged the floor of MCC Chicago’s kitchen, the kitchen was undergoing a complete renovation with an anticipated cost of at least $700,000.
- We also observed floor damage in food service areas at FCC Pollock and USP McCreary. Specifically, in the inmate cafeteria at USP McCreary, we saw water seeping through broken floor tiles and emitting a strong and unpleasant odor. (We note that we were unable to determine the source of the water.) The BOP acknowledged that when stagnant water gets trapped under damaged floor tiles it can create an unpleasant smell.
- At FCI Marianna and FCC Pollock, temperatures in kitchens where BOP employees and inmates work were very hot. Specifically, we measured a kitchen temperature of 93 degrees F at FCI Marianna and 86 degrees F at FCC Pollock. A Pollock employee told us that the kitchen area is “extremely hot” and that the inmates are “working in brutal heat.”
Reference to Previous Work
In May 2023, the OIG reported that BOP institutions had a large and growing list of unfunded modernization and repair needs and that the BOP was unable to address these needs because it lacked a strategy to do so. Further, we found that the BOP had historically failed to request funding to address its infrastructure needs (as of 2024, the BOP estimated that it had a $3 billion backlog of unfunded infrastructure repairs across all of its institutions). To address this issue, the OIG recommended that the BOP develop an infrastructure strategy to increase the overall effectiveness of facilities management and to develop and implement key performance indicators to track whether the BOP is meeting its infrastructure goals. As of the publication of this food service inspection product, these recommendations remain open.
During prior inspections and other prior work, we have identified institution-specific infrastructure issues that negatively affected the administration of food service, as well as the broader conditions of confinement for inmates and working conditions for BOP employees. For example:
- At FCI Waseca, we found that institution roofs were in disrepair, which allowed water to intrude into and damage the food service area. Additionally, we found that inmate beds were near pipes that occasionally leaked.
- At FCI Tallahassee, in a food storage warehouse, we found large, open holes that could let in insects and rodents. In the inmate cafeteria, we observed a window that could not be closed, which allowed water intrusion. In housing units, water frequently leaked from ceilings and windows on or near inmates’ living spaces.
- At FCI Lewisburg, we found that water intruded into the meat-butchering area, rendering the area unusable, and had weakened the ceiling to the point that the institution had to install metal braces to support it. Additionally, water was intruding into a secure kitchen-equipment area and could flow into an adjacent food preparation room.
- At MCC New York, due to structural failures of a loading dock above the kitchen, large chunks of concrete had broken off and fallen into the kitchen.
FREEZERS AND REFRIGERATORS
Freezers or refrigerators at three of the six institutions did not maintain temperatures in compliance with BOP standards (at or below 0 degrees F for freezers and at or below 41 degrees F for refrigerators) established for food safety. For example:
- At FCC Pollock, we observed five freezers and two refrigerators with internal temperature readings that exceeded the maximum allowable temperatures.
- At FCI Marianna, we observed four refrigerators with an internal temperature reading that exceeded the maximum allowable temperature. We also found that the door to one of these refrigerators and one other freezer did not fully close, potentially creating temperature fluctuations in the refrigerator and freezer.
- At USP McCreary, we observed indicia of thawed and refrozen food in a freezer that employees told us regularly experienced temperature fluctuations and refrigerant leaks.
The failure of this equipment to maintain those temperatures was concerning because storing food above those temperatures may allow the growth of harmful bacteria and organisms, increasing the risk of foodborne illness.
Some freezers at USP McCreary and FCI Mendota were completely inoperable, requiring the institutions to rent costly mobile trailer freezers for extended periods.
MOBILE HEATING CARTS
At FCC Pollock and FCI Mendota, mobile carts used to transport food from the kitchen to housing units had inoperable heating components. Lengthy delays in the delivery of originally hot food via unheated carts can create potential food safety risks. However, we did not directly observe delays in the delivery of prepared food for a duration that could create food safety risks.
SANITATION, HANDWASHING, AND SOAP
At USP McCreary, we found a dirty kitchen that had the pervasive smell of raw meat. Further, in a broken walk-in refrigerator with a temperature of 80 degrees F, we found a large amount of day-old prepared food that had been left in uncovered serving trays. We also found that there was no soap in a bathroom used by inmates who prepare food. The lack of readily available soap for inmates who prepare food is an obvious sanitation concern and undermines institution efforts to comply with BOP policy, which requires inmates who work in food service to employ proper handwashing techniques. According to Food Service Department employees, inmates could access soap if they requested it.
PRECARIOUSLY STACKED FOOD PALLETS
At USP McCreary, FCI Marianna, and FCI Mendota, pallets of food were precariously stacked, creating a serious risk that heavy packages could fall onto BOP employees or inmates who work in food storage areas.
ICE ACCUMULATION ON FLOORS
Ice accumulated on the floor inside and at the entrance of freezers at USP McCreary, FCI Marianna, and FCC Allenwood, creating a serious risk of slip-and-fall injuries for BOP employees and inmates.
Inspection Results Summary Table
The table below summarizes the deficiencies we identified at each institution and shows that USP McCreary and FCI Marianna had the greatest number of deficiencies. When considering the overall volume and nature of the deficiencies, we also determined that USP McCreary’s deficiencies were the most significant of all the institutions we inspected. In comparison, FCC Allenwood and MCC Chicago had the fewest deficiencies of the institutions we inspected, and we came away with a positive impression of their food service operations; however, we note that at the time of our inspection MCC Chicago’s kitchen was undergoing a complete renovation and the institution could not always prepare and cook certain items required by the BOP’s National Menu.
At the conclusion of each inspection’s site visit, we shared our findings with local institution managers. In advance of publication, we also provided the BOP with drafts of this product to ensure that all issues were communicated to senior BOP officials and to facilitate updates on the status of concerning areas. For findings that stem from long-standing, enterprise-wide concerns identified in the DOJ OIG’s body of BOP oversight work, the OIG already has made recommendations that more broadly encompass the problems we identified through this project; accordingly, we do not make new recommendations in the areas of contraband, staffing shortages, cameras, or infrastructure.
For other areas of concern, we obtained confirmation from BOP officials that many of the problems were addressed prior to the publication of this product. For example, much of the malfunctioning major food storage equipment we identified during the inspections has now been repaired and thus we do not make specific recommendations in this product about those pieces of equipment. However, given the number of major food service equipment malfunctions we identified during these inspections, we believe that similar problems may exist enterprise-wide. Therefore, in August 2024 the OIG initiated an audit of the BOP’s Acquisition and Life-Cycle Management of Major Equipment Supporting Food Services. The OIG anticipates that a forthcoming report will provide greater detail on such issues and will make appropriate recommendations to address them. Throughout the content below, we have also included updates that the BOP shared on specific issues identified through these inspections.
Methodology
We selected the six institutions for inspection based on their relative scores on the OIG’s prison inspection risk assessment tool, as well as the volume and nature of complaints submitted to the OIG regarding institution operations. While on site, we interviewed BOP employees and inmates, made physical observations of food and food storage areas, and reviewed security camera footage. We also reviewed records pertaining to staffing levels, sanitation, food purchase orders, funding requests for repair and maintenance of equipment and infrastructure, and employee injury and illness reports (see Appendix 1 for more details on the methodology).
Results by Institution
Appendices
Standards
The DOJ OIG conducted these inspections in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency’s Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation (December 2020).
Purpose and Scope
The OIG has determined that it can enhance the effectiveness of its oversight, as well as its ability to alert the BOP of concerns, by conducting short-notice and unannounced inspections of BOP institutions, as appropriate. In June 2024, we focused unannounced, concurrent inspections on the administration of food service at six selected institutions given the serious food service-related issues we identified during prior inspections of other institutions.
On Tuesday June 4, 2024, at 10 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST), the OIG simultaneously notified all six selected institutions of its intention to begin its inspections by 11 a.m. EST.1 At the latter time, teams of four OIG employees each simultaneously initiated on-site inspections at the selected institutions. The inspections were conducted through Thursday, June 6.
Our scope was the state of food service operations at the time of our inspections, although, for certain portions of our analysis our scope included roughly the year that preceded our inspections, beginning in 2023. We also considered information, provided by the BOP after the inspections, that described BOP efforts to address the issues we identified during the inspections.
Methodology
We selected U.S. Penitentiary (USP) McCreary, Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Marianna, Federal Correctional Complex (FCC) Pollock, Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) Chicago, FCC Allenwood, and FCI Mendota for inspection based on their relative scores from the OIG’s prison inspection risk assessment tool, as well as the volume and nature of complaints submitted to the OIG regarding institution operations. To better understand the administration of food service at each of the six institutions, we observed food service operations, interviewed inmates and employees, and reviewed and analyzed relevant food service records.
Observations
The six institutions we inspected housed inmates at all of the BOP security levels, which includes administrative, high, medium, low, and minimum. While on site, we observed food service equipment, food storage warehouses, food preparation and dining areas, and lunch and dinner services. We also recorded temperatures of food served hot. We tested prepared-food temperatures, as well as ambient temperatures in food storage areas, including freezers and refrigerators. Due to the cold temperatures within freezers and refrigerators, the OIG’s temperature measuring equipment was unable to record reliable independent temperature readings. As a result, we had to rely on the internal temperature readings of the BOP's equipment. Further, we did not perform specialized testing to definitively determine, for example, the potential presence of mold and other hazardous substances. Finally, we reviewed security camera footage to assess Food Service Department operations and to assess the degree to which security cameras provided visual coverage of food service areas.
Interviews
At each of the six BOP institutions, we conducted on-site interviews with inmates who worked for the Food Service Department, inmates housed in general population, inmates housed in restrictive housing, and inmates who received diets based on religious or medical restrictions. We also interviewed Wardens, Associate Wardens, Food Service Administrators, Assistant Food Service Administrators, Facilities Managers, Cook Foremen Supervisors, Warehouse Foremen, Contract Specialists, and other employees responsible for food service operations.
Document Review and Analysis
For each of the six BOP institutions, we reviewed food service-related records, including staffing data, sanitation inspection reports, food purchase orders, funding requests for repair and maintenance of equipment and infrastructure, and employee injury and illness reports.
1 USP McCreary and FCC Allenwood are located within the EST Zone, and the inspections were initiated at 11 a.m. local time. MCC Chicago, FCC Pollock, and FCI Marianna are located within the Central Standard Time Zone, and those inspections were initiated at 10 a.m. local time. FCI Mendota is located within the Pacific Standard Time Zone, and that inspection was initiated at 8 a.m. local time.
For prior OIG reporting on the BOP’s infrastructure management challenges, see DOJ OIG, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Efforts to Maintain and Construct Institutions, Audit Report 23-064 (May 2023), oig.justice.gov/reports/federal-bureau-prisons-efforts-maintain-and-construct-institutions.
For prior OIG reporting on the BOP’s staffing challenges, see DOJ OIG, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Justice–2022 (December 2022), oig.justice.gov/reports/top-management-and-performance-challenges-facing-department-justice-2022.
For prior OIG reporting on the insufficiency of BOP security camera systems, see DOJ OIG, Management Advisory Memorandum: Notification of Needed Upgrades to the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Security Camera System, Evaluation and Inspections (E&I) Report 22-001 (October 2021), oig.justice.gov/reports/management-advisory-memorandum-notification-needed-upgrades-federal-bureau-prisons-security.
For the inspection report on Federal Medical Center Devens, see DOJ OIG, Inspection of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Federal Medical Center Devens, E&I Report 25-009 (December 2024), oig.justice.gov/reports/inspection-federal-bureau-prisons-federal-medical-center-devens.
For the inspection report on Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Lewisburg, see DOJ OIG, Inspection of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Federal Correctional Institution Lewisburg, E&I Report 24-113 (September 2024), oig.justice.gov/reports/inspection-federal-bureau-prisons-federal-correctional-institution-lewisburg.
For the inspection report on FCI Sheridan, see DOJ OIG, Inspection of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Federal Correctional Institution Sheridan, E&I Report 24-070 (May 2024), oig.justice.gov/reports/inspection-federal-bureau-prisons-federal-correctional-institution-sheridan.
For the inspection report on FCI Tallahassee, see DOJ OIG, Inspection of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Federal Correctional Institution Tallahassee, E&I Report 24-005 (November 2023), oig.justice.gov/reports/inspection-federal-bureau-prisons-federal-correctional-institution-tallahassee.
For the inspection report on FCI Waseca, see DOJ OIG, Inspection of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Federal Correctional Institution Waseca, E&I Report 23-068 (May 2023), oig.justice.gov/reports/inspection-federal-bureau-prisons-federal-correctional-institution-waseca.
For the report that discusses infrastructure issues at MCC New York, see DOJ OIG, Limited-Scope Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Strategies to Identify, Communicate, and Remedy Operational Issues, E&I Report 23-065 (May 2023), oig.justice.gov/reports/limited-scope-review-federal-bureau-prisons-strategies-identify-communicate-and-remedy.
Relevant Program Statements
April 2024
The OIG provided a draft of this product to the BOP for its comment. The BOP’s response is here. In its formal response, the BOP acknowledged the issues identified in this product and described actions that it has already taken to rectify the findings. The OIG acknowledged many of these efforts in the final product and will continue to include assessments of food service operations as part of future OIG inspections to ensure that issues such as those identified during these inspections are addressed throughout the BOP.