The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) just announced indictments resulting from Operation Ghostbusters, which investigated widespread student loan fraud. According to the agency, bad actors used stolen identities to sign up for student loans and used AI to complete the application, making it appear that the fake student was attending online classes.

While the schools receive the majority of the proceeds of the fraudulent student loan, the remaining amount is funneled into the bank accounts of the fraudsters, who then use mules to move the money from U.S. bank accounts to overseas conspirators. On the other hand, unwitting victims who have skipped college and instead directly joined the workforce after high school are saddled with student debt for a degree they never even signed up for.

Multiple community colleges and universities across the United States started suspecting fraud in the Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) program in 2021. Estimates suggest the U.S. government lost over $200 million because of this activity, and the U.S. Department of Education Office of the Inspector General referred the case to the FBI Richmond Field Office. Currently, more than 40 open fraud cases involve 26 FBI field offices and 20 U.S. Attorney’s offices. The DOJ called it Operation Ghostbusters, which has already resulted in the indictment of five individuals.

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“Today, we are announcing the first results of Operation Ghostbusters — a nationwide effort to stop a major fraud scheme targeting federal student aid, low-income Americans, and the American taxpayer,” Assistant Attorney General Colin M. McDonald of the Justice Department’s National Fraud Enforcement Division said in the statement.

“The Department is charging five defendants and announcing the seizure of more than $750,000 in cryptocurrency tied to this scheme through a network associated with Kenyan nationals. This is the first international seizure of its kind in Kenya. If you steal American identities, if you steal taxpayer dollars, if you exploit programs meant to help students build a future — we will find you. Whether you are in Nebraska, New Jersey, Virginia, or Nairobi, we will pursue you.”

While online fraud has existed since the birth of the internet, AI has let scammers become more sophisticated and target bigger payouts. One example is a scammer who used an AI-generated image of Brad Pitt to scam a 53-year-old woman out of $850,000. However, larger groups also use AI tools for their money-making schemes, such as North Korea, which has reportedly used AI to help its workers get jobs in Western companies and earn money to fund the nation’s coffers. The U.S. is taking steps to shut down student loan fraud by deploying automated fraud detection systems, but the added burden of identification and false positives is negatively affecting the country's most vulnerable students.

South Korean authorities have identified 80 Tesla drivers who allegedly forced Full Self-Driving (FSD) onto cars that were never cleared for it, Electrek reports. The Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency says it confiscated 21 of the devices used to switch the feature on. The unlock modules reportedly connect to the car’s CAN bus (the internal network that links its electronic control units) and get around the regional software lock that keeps FSD disabled. That works because Tesla builds the same computer into every car, whether or not the feature is approved locally.

Some suspects bought ready-made units from Europe and China, and one reportedly plugged a European-made module into his own Tesla. Others skipped the shopping. One suspect, an IT worker, built his device using information he found on GitHub, which suggests the barrier to entry for this kind of modification is lower than it sounds. The group also traded tips online, including how to stop the car from keeping any record that FSD had been activated. Concealing the activation history is likely an attempt to avoid detection by Tesla, which has been looking for these devices itself.

Then there is the legal risk, where prosecutors are using the Motor Vehicle Management Act, which bans unauthorized software changes that could affect vehicle safety. In Korea, the maximum penalty is two years in prison or a fine of up to 20 million won, or roughly $15,000, a steep price for a driver-assistance feature that many of these owners had already paid for.

South Korea’s transport ministry first flagged suspicious activations to police in April. “Safety risks were confirmed, including the possibility that FSD may fail to properly recognize driving conditions or operate differently from the driver’s intentions,” a police official said then.

Notably, the root of the problem is a certification gap. Tesla began offering FSD (Supervised) in South Korea in late 2025, but only on US-built Model S, Model X, and Cybertruck units, which skip local safety certification under the Korea-US free trade agreement. The Model 3 and Model Y arrive from Giga Shanghai and have yet to pass. Nobody agrees on how many Korean Teslas are eligible, although Carisyou Data Lab figures cited by MK last month indicate 47,458 of 229,311 cars (20.7%).

The South Korean investigation follows Tesla’s own efforts to stop unauthorized activation. In April, the company began remotely detecting unlock devices and disabling FSD access on affected vehicles. It has also warned owners that unauthorized modifications could void warranty coverage and leave them liable for crashes. Moreover, the restrictions are not the first time Tesla’s software protections have come under scrutiny. In August 2023, researchers exploited a hardware security flaw in the AMD processor powering Tesla’s media control unit to unlock certain paid features. The exploit targeted the car’s AMD-based system-on-chip, although researchers did not confirm that every premium feature could be unlocked.

Tesla has also faced regulatory scrutiny over software restrictions. In December 2021, the US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration investigated the company after an over-the-air update allowed drivers to play certain games while their vehicles were moving. The case highlighted how software changes can raise safety concerns when features are accessible under conditions regulators consider unsafe. Hardware reliability is another challenge for Tesla. Last year, the company detailed how it identifies defective processor cores in its Dojo AI supercomputers, where a single faulty component can compromise lengthy training runs.

Systems administrators are among the first to point out lax security policies in other companies' or people's setups. Sometimes, they are the ones who get bitten by not taking the same advice they will so readily dispense. Such is the tale of Reddit user NakamuraHwang, who had files on their Synology DS918+ NAS encrypted by a ransomware attack after making a series of unforced errors.

Hwang appears to be quite technically proficient and provided a detailed write-up of the situation. The key points, however, are that the unit in question (a) had its web interface exposed to the internet and (b) was roughly 18 months out-of-date with security patches. Just like the recent PHP snafu has adeptly shown, complacency is a far worse enemy than an army of AI bots.

The tech has a 3-2-1 backup setup, so they seemingly didn't lose any data. They attached the disks to a Proxmox machine for further inspection — Synology's DSM operating system uses mdraid underneath, so you can take the disks to another box and mount them there. Investigation of logs and the operating system files revealed that the attack was likely performed by abusing the CVE-2024-10441 remote code execution vulnerability, revealed a year and a half ago.

As most any other sysadmin will tell you, it's never advisable to expose devices directly to the internet without some layer of protection in between, chiefly but not only a VPN or an SSH tunnel. Tailscale, for instance, makes having a VPN fairly painless these days, and its free plan covers most home installations.

Synology had published its own advisory regarding the exploit, but that's where the NAS' behavior regarding updates complicates matters. According to multiple comments on the thread and in other forums, the UI will happily tell you that your device is up to date, all while there are critical security updates that need to be manually installed. The manual for DSM indicates that units from 2025 onwards have automatic updates, apparently implying that those of previous makes need to be configured so.

Furthermore, Synology apparently doesn't have a direct channel to warn its customers of critical security vulnerabilities —a simple e-mail notification would suffice. Although the firm is seemingly shifting away from consumer gear, it still sells small units that regular users might buy, and it's not reasonable to expect them to even be aware of security bulletins. Plus, package updates like the patch for the PHP2Shell vulnerability have to be installed separately, too.

Malicious GitHub repositories masquerading as two well-known and legitimate PS5 game emulation tools have been identified as spreading malware that steals gamers' passwords. The malware uses self-signed certificates, created using fake company names and on the same day the malware was built — suggesting that the malware campaign may be automated. Just two minutes after infection, a cleanup script scrubs the affected computer of the malware's files, leaving no trace that it was ever present, according to a report shared with Tom's Hardware by NordVPN's Threat Intelligence research team.

The campaign trades on the back of the popularity of two projects that have become popular within the PS5 emulation community. AnyPS5 is a portability layer that allows PS5 games to run as native applications on both Windows and Linux. Kyttyps5 is an emulator for running PS5 games on PCs, and both projects are freely available for download via their respective GitHub repositories. However, users who visit one of the malicious repositories posing as these tools are directed to download a zip file containing a Windows executable. Notably, the GitHub repositories used as part of the malware campaign rapidly rotate, and it's possible that GitHub is not the only source.

The malicious executable unpacks a hidden application before launching its own multi-stage loader. It first checks whether the PC is a legitimate machine or a security researcher's sandbox by checking if less than 2GB of RAM is available, if it's a virtual machine, if it's running on a cloud-based server, or if it doesn't have a physical GPU installed. If any of those criteria are met, the loader exits silently. If the machine is deemed to be a legitimate target, the malware adds exclusion rules to Microsoft Defender to ensure that it will never be scanned and identified during an antivirus scan. Finally, the payload is decrypted and executed.

That payload, we're told, is an executable protected by a commercial packer that is believed to be an infostealer — a type of malware whose job it is to steal passwords as well as any other sensitive data that it comes across.

While this appears to be a relatively new malware attack, there are some steps that you can take to avoid falling foul of it. If you're trying to download tools like AnyPS5 and Kyttyps5, it's vital to ensure that the repository belongs to the official project team. Double-check the owner of the project, look for download links that use third-party destinations, and check metadata like the project and files' creation dates.

If you do find yourself in a position where you have accessed a suspected malicious download, disconnect your computer from the internet and run a full antivirus scan. It's also recommended that you change your passwords from a separate device where possible.

PS5 emulation is likely to become more popular than ever once GTA 6 is released on November 19, 2026. The game will be a console exclusive at launch, with a PC version expected to arrive in early 2027.

Discover-Tech, an Israeli advertising technology company, has reportedly been linked to a suspected surveillance effort aimed at Starlink users, according to Reuters. The report, which cites six people familiar with the matter, claims the firm was the top bidder for ad space tied to Starlink traffic in more than 100 countries. Researchers suspect the aggressive bidding was meant to reveal where users are located or to enable further monitoring — though the findings do not show that anyone was actually tracked.

The data comes from TrendAI, the research arm of Trend Micro. Its October 15 report referred to the activity as ‘Shadow-Earth-79’ without naming a company, but the report claims the codename belongs to Discover-Tech. TrendAI says its attribution process is designed to avoid ‘hype-driven labels’ that could mislead security teams. “Our approach reduces the risk of misattribution, hype-driven labels, and unstable actor names that can mislead defenders, distort risk prioritization, and trigger inappropriate response actions.” The report says.

The method exploits how online ads are sold with advertisers bidding in real-time auctions for space on websites and in apps, and each bid request can carry details about the person on the other end. Collected over time and combined with other data, that information could be used to identify people, follow their activity across the web, or select targets for spyware.

The geography is what raised eyebrows. Shadow-Earth-79 was reportedly the largest ad buyer in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and South Sudan, and the second largest in Afghanistan, while also claiming unusually large shares of bids in Hungary, Israel, Egypt, Azerbaijan, and Venezuela. TrendAI says the pattern points to ‘targeting and tracking infrastructure rather than a commercial advertising operation.’ That is plausible, given how little legitimate Western advertising demand exists in sanctioned or war-torn markets.

Notably, Discover-Tech was already under scrutiny. On the same day as TrendAI’s report, Citizen Lab and ad security firm Confiant separately named the company, alleging that it used ad auctions to collect data on users across sensitive networks, including those tied to media organizations, governments, and tech firms. “The malicious advertisements were purchased by Discover-Tech, an Israeli company that presents itself as a legitimate advertising company, but which we found operates as a facilitator for multiple mercenary spyware partners.” Citizen Lab wrote.

Google and Comcast have since said they removed Discover-Tech from their advertising platforms, while the report says that a major U.S. technology company and an international organization have opened internal inquiries into whether the firm’s ads targeted their employees.

For Starlink, the stakes are obvious — the service works outside conventional telecom networks, which makes it a lifeline where governments restrict internet access, and makes its users an attractive target for those same governments. In April, Iran’s nationwide internet blackout passed 1,000 hours, with authorities reportedly going after Starlink terminals and imposing severe penalties for possessing one. Earlier this month, SpaceX also limited Starlink service for Ukraine’s high-speed military drones, which Ukrainian officials say complicates logistics and operations.

Advertising and consumer tech have been abused for tracking before. A backdoor was previously found in a popular iOS ad library that could collect device-location data and capture screenshots, while Chrysaor, Android spyware linked to the Pegasus family, was discovered by Lookout and Citizen Lab on a small number of devices. More recently, a researcher claimed to have found extensive data collection, including ad-related telemetry, inside a Samsung smart TV’s Tizen operating system, though those findings are still being investigated.

That said, it is still unclear if Discover-Tech actually used Starlink-related data to single out specific subscribers remains unverified, and neither the company nor SpaceX has commented.

The AI-powered inrush of software vulnerability reports over the last year has shined a light on how many critical pieces of open-source software are chronically underfunded. The latest victim is PHP, the scripting language powering about 71% of websites, making the news due to a critical remote code execution vulnerability. The PHP Foundation, which develops and oversees the language, reportedly counts only one full-time person and 14 "mostly part-time" contractors. That's bad enough, but the real problem goes far deeper thanks to the internet's lazy development practices and systems administration.

In an interview with Reuters, the PHP Foundation's Executive Director Elizabeth Barron spells it out clearly: she's the only full-time person on staff, and works with the contractors' help. Pertaining to the software itself, the team's job is to develop and maintain the PHP core, including taking care of security fixes. The core team accepts contributions from the world at large, in an arrangement not too dissimilar to Linux kernel development — except that project is far better-manned, with many full-time contributors and company-employed developers.

Naturally, the PHP foundation collaborates with other companies and many cybersecurity firms, but the dev team was stretched thin even before the increase in security vulnerabilities with the help of countless AI agents. Barron does note that there was no reported exploitation of PHP2Shell before the security fix came out.

But the lack of a higher funding level likely led to the "structural failure" to address the underlying vulnerability in a timely manner, as the out-of-memory condition (OOM) that eventually led to the 2026 exploits was originally discovered in 2024. Given how widespread PHP is, and how many third-party extensions there are, the work on fixing the OOM problem "stalled and restarted repeatedly over months." It didn't help that the Chainguard security firm broke the PHP2Shell embargo too early by accident.

Even still, the team is thankful for the money it has, as "without the Foundation’s funding it would have been impossible to have multiple people work on this issue full time, eventually through weekends and around the clock to coordinate and communicate with other involved parties." One would hope that this latest incident releases the purse strings of more companies that make their living off of PHP.

And yet, this failing is far larger than just bugs in the core language, which, notably, were only one point update away. In theory, any server running the current 8.x brand of the software should be upgraded in minutes with the released patches, but reality was far different, as websites went down for hours or days out of fear of exploitation.

The real problem reared its ugly head: nearly 73% of PHP installations were running versions well past their end-of-life (EOL) date, meaning that obtaining fixes is now far harder. Many professionals who worked with the language, including yours truly, had spent decades warning of this reckoning, even considering many Linux distributions were backporting fixes.

Many of these servers were still running PHP 7, a version that was completely EOL'd four years ago, with many years of advance warning, and that originally came out in late 2015, almost eleven years back. If that doesn't sound silly enough, let it sink in that around 7.7% of PHP sites were still running version 5.x, which first saw the light of day 22 years ago in 2005, and saw the final sunset in 2018. It's safe to say that everyone had plenty of time to prepare.

To further illustrate the ridiculousness of collective complacency: the jump from PHP 5 to 7 and then from 7 to 8 required changing sections of website code, but the vast majority of said changes are simple to find and apply, and even before AI, there were already automated code-patching tools around. A couple years ago I mapped them all out for a PHP 5-to-8 codebase conversion myself.

Most of the alterations were about dropping support for ancient functions and libraries, which themselves had had long-standing warnings of incoming deprecation. Not a lot of core language features underwent modification, and a lot of convenient syntax was added to help clarify fiddly, error-prone code, too. That the overall situation got to this point beggars belief and illustrates how complacency, laziness, and cost-cutting are a far bigger force than a cadre of AI bots digging for flaws.

Reverse engineer and cybersecurity bounty hunter log4j recently found they were getting “weirdly targeted ads” on their Samsung TV and discovered privacy breaches. As they live-tweeted their discoveries, they found increasingly concerning code in the Tizen operating system, including detailed user telemetry from packet logging, audio categorization, screenshots, cross-device identification for ad tracking, and more, all designed to extract as much user information as possible to improve targeted ads.

log4j posted on X that they were concerned with how specific the ads on their 2025 Samsung TV were. They decided to reverse-engineer the Tizen OS on their TV to see what it was doing—they “discovered PRIVACY HORROR,” log4j states, marking the start of subsequent posts sharing more concerning findings.

The tester theorizes that Samsung TVs are so sluggish because they do a lot of post-processing of user data, including audio, screenshots, and AID (a cross-device tracking ID for ads), plus computer vision processing and models running on the TV. The hacker even found a region-specific convolutional neural network (an AI) that tracks user behavior, citing examples like what videos the user watches, which ads are skipped, and video progress. Log4j also found behavior for TVs without microphones, stating it will find connected devices with microphones, such as a soundbar or a connected Bluetooth device, to record audio.

Hugging Face engineer ngxson commented that they would test the microphone behavior using their Flipper Zero and found that the TV opened the microphone for five seconds, then stopped. ngxson waited for another microphone response but found none hours later. However, ngxson explained that their Tizen TV was already rooted and had multiple settings disabled, so an unmodified TV may behave differently.

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The hacker used OpenAI tools to hack the TV, but the company eventually banned them for cyber abuse, as stated in an email they received. log4j defended themselves, saying they never used OpenAI’s tools to exploit or find vulnerabilities, only for local reverse engineering, and that they didn't breach the terms of use. In a comment below their post about the ban, log4j said it seemed OpenAI banned their account because of a primitive classifier.

However, Samsung TVs and Tizen aren’t the only culprits in reportedly breaching user privacy; other brands like LG have also been accused of spying on customers. Many owners have also reported their TVs slowing down despite no new features or heavy apps running, suspecting it is mainly bloatware, but it could also be the spying behavior Log4j found. The hacker is also working on a comprehensive write-up of their findings, including how others could do it themselves.

At the end of the post series, they jokingly say they “finally found a company that truly listens to its customers.”

The FCC recently imposed a new rule allowing it to ban devices based on the internal chips instead of basing bans on individual products or brands, thus closing the loophole of rebranded products with parts from Chinese manufacturers on US export restriction lists. Using this new rule, the FCC has banned two devices from being sold and marketed in the US for the first time: a dashboard camera and a wireless video transmitter. As reported by The Verge, these devices were banned due to the HiSilicon Smart Vision SoC (System on a Chip) they contain, which features built-in detection algorithms for faces. HiSilicon is a subsidiary of Huawei, and the firm and its subsidiaries are on the FCC’s Covered List of entities that pose a risk to US national security.

The Hi3516CV610 UHD Smart Vision is an SoC for surveillance and camera products. The SoC is meant to be used for things like vehicle dashcams and wireless CCTV systems; fully equipped with WiFi, Ethernet, video encoding chips, an Arm Cortex-A7, and an NPU (Neural Processing Unit) for AI features. The NPU is what the FCC is concerned about, explaining that it is a device that contains logic-bearing “smart” components produced by entities on the Covered List.

On the SoC’s data sheet, the Intelligent Video Engine (IVE) uses the NPU that runs a built-in dedicated multimodal large model and transformer feature acceleration. The transformer feature acceleration allows the AI model to understand the relationship between objects from one video frame to another, keeping “attention” between related objects: pets, faces, human figures, and parcels, as the data sheet advertises. For consumers, this potentially means the AI in a surveillance camera can understand whether it is your pet that is escaping, or an unknown person is stealing your parcel after understanding that it was placed by a courier worker.

However, the FCC believes the logic-bearing AI in the SoC can do something much more nefarious, surveying US citizens and logging faces for foreign surveillance. Huawei already had a previous AI chip scandal, using shell companies to deceive TSMC into producing AI chips for them, going against the US’ request for TSMC to halt supplies to a list of Chinese customers; among other Huawei scandals leading to other product bans in the US.

A new report claims that major U.S. banks have now detected AI agents accessing customer accounts, and that some are even attempting to make transactions. Axios reports that it’s hard to differentiate between an actual human and an unauthorized bot, which is why some institutions, including Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, JPMorgan, and Wells Fargo, are blocking the technology and changing their terms of service to account for this.

While an AI agent or AI assistant can access an account with a user’s permission and through the use of their login credentials, this often goes against bank policy that requires users to maintain control of their account and not share it with anyone else. One of the fears that executives have is when an AI agent with login access takes unauthorized steps, like spending money or moving funds around without the explicit instructions of the account owner. There have even been situations where an AI agent called the bank directly and took actions independent of direct user command. Even though it wasn’t explicitly told to do that transaction, it considered it a crucial step to accomplish the task assigned to it.

One hypothetical example of this is when a user tells an AI agent to purchase an item but gives it a credit card with no available limit. The AI agent could then have accessed the user’s bank account to move some funds from whatever account it sees that has available funds to then effect the transaction, even if the user did not explicitly tell them that they could use the money in that said account. This is just one example where an AI agent’s transaction could go wrong, which is why several U.S. banks are now restricting third-party AI agents from accessing their platforms. Nevertheless, they still recognize that their customers might want to use tools like AI agents to monitor their finances. This is why some institutions have given or are moving towards read-only access for AI agents, which is something that they’ve been doing for years already.

The move comes against a background of burgeoning AI agent use, coupled with the risk that agents can and often do act beyond their remit, making mistakes or performing tasks without instruction, often with disastrous results. An unsupervised AI agent recently deleted a TV show's entire edit weeks before broadcast, forcing the program off air. AI agents are notorious for deleting databases and directories, making it a small leap to imagine they cause some havoc with unfettered access to a bank account.

Financial institutions have deep experience when it comes to employing new technology while ensuring that their critical infrastructure remains safe — something that AI labs lack, according to a former OpenAI safety employee. Despite that, banks are still concerned about the speed at which AI technology is developing, fearing that the technology’s capabilities might outrun their ability to control it, which is why they’re preparing for worst-case scenarios and even planning for “day after” scenarios after a catastrophic AI event.

A Hacker News user who shared news about the recent PHP vulnerabilities revealed by ChatGPT Sol before an embargo, which they claimed to be unaware of, has taken to the platform to apologize for the post. According to petecooper, they shared the CVEs because they wanted to alert others who follow the four-week PHP release cycle about the importance and urgency of the matter, but they weren’t aware of the news blackout that went with the two identified vulnerabilities.

The user said they have "No connection or affiliation to any of the organisations involved." Noting, "I am a self-employed consultant for my day job, and a solo founder of a mental health non-profit on the side." Petecooper's original post about the vulnerability was among the first to break the NDA, though they claim they were unaware.

“I posted here about the then-upcoming PHP RCEs related to CVE-2026-109618 & CVE-2026-109619. I appreciate this has had considerable knock-on effects with the schedule for co-ordinated disclosure, and created additional workload. I am truly sorry. I take full responsibility for my actions,” petecooper wrote on the platform. “It was not remotely my intention to cause any of the subsequent side effects. At the time of posting, I didn’t know about any embargo. My contact had told me there was no embargo, and her contact had told her the same thing.”

CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 are two critical vulnerabilities, both scored at 9.2. It seemed that the PHP Foundation planned for a controlled public release, allowing affected websites and applications to be patched before the vulnerabilities became widely known. Unfortunately, it seemed that some recipients of the warning failed to share the embargo that came alongside the CVEs, spreading the news earlier than expected.

It should be noted that petecooper apparently wasn’t the only one who leaked the news early. Multiple leaks had already been circulating on social media and other platforms, which forced the PHP Foundation to move its announcement up by one day. Despite that, the organization mentioned that Chainguard broke the embargo by more than six hours. Dan Lorenc, the co-founder and CEO of Chainguard, defended the move on LinkedIn, saying that he made the call after talking to several other researchers and immediately notified the group after releasing the fix publicly, and not just his customers.

The vulnerabilities tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 were bugs in the PHP runtime itself that were discovered using AI tools, not attacks by rogue AI. Still, the abilities of this technology could make it easier for both security researchers and bad actors to find vulnerabilities that could have been lurking in widely used code for years, if not decades. This makes it a race to find and deploy a fix before they can be exploited.

China-state-aligned actor Storm-0940 used ARTEX, an open-source agentic AI penetration testing framework, in its large-scale ConnectWise supply chain attack, Microsoft wrote in its Security blog. After unauthorized access to the multi-tenant application, the group attempted sign-ins at more than 2,250 Microsoft 365 tenants, with stolen ConnectWise app credentials that authenticated as the apps with no interactive user sign-in. Some of the group’s attacks reached privileged access less than three hours after initial targeting.

Automated password guessing, or password spraying, also targeted 327 accounts across eight organizations with more than 151,000 failed logons and no successes. The use of ARTEX, “a system of LLM-driven agents that run an autonomous penetration test,” sped up scanning and reconnaissance, password spraying, and OAuth application abuse. The agents can work around the clock “with little needed human interaction,” at a pace that “leaves defenders with little time to detect and respond.” It’s uncertain how the ConnectWise credentials were stolen or how many tenants were actually compromised.

Storm-0940, active since 2021, is a “China-state aligned actor” with “no known industry aliases,” and its name follows the convention for a developing actor. Industries targeted this time include aerospace and defense, semiconductor, government, and think tanks, with 14 listed in total. The activity “did not result from a compromise of or a vulnerability” in Microsoft’s systems, products, or services.

At its peak on Oct. 11, the password spray engaged in 2,900 attempts, all failures, per minute, at more than 111,000 for that day, with 48 accounts logging more than 1,000 failures each. Almost 98% of this activity was locked out. However, with control of the identities of multiple ConnectWise cloud apps, the attacking AI agents signed in to customer tenants from the same IP range using those apps’ credentials, with more than 200 sign-ins in under four minutes using four application credentials. Operations taken within some tenants include Graph and directory operations, reconnaissance, app credential changes, plus changes to identities, groups, and privileged roles.

In one tenant on Oct. 15, Huntress, a security firm, saw an app add itself to the top administrator role, the behavior behind the Microsoft Defender alert “Application self-assigned Global Administrator role.” Actions included planting new secrets set to expire in 2028. It confirmed unauthorized sign-ins for 162 tenants by Oct. 16 and, a day later, almost 1,000 Entra tenants with sign-in activity from the attacking IP, with more than 300 succeeding. The attack’s sweep through tenants in sorted order, a few seconds apart, indicated “a script working from a target list.”

What differs from many traditional attacks is the use of the open-source pentest framework that, Microsoft says, can use any AI model. Threat actors in multiple regions are using the technology, and public reporting this month tied it to breaches at South Korean financial institutions. CrowdStrike said the suspect in those separate attacks was likely based in China and allegedly used ARTEX with Anthropic’s Claude Code. ARTEX’s developer, who goes by the handle “Autumn-27,” said on GitHub that the ARTEX project “will no longer be updated” and would become closed source, Reuters reported.

ConnectWise noted the unauthorized access and suspended Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick) as well as SaaS Security and Cloud Management as a precaution. It has started a phased restoration with recovery expected to take several days and has no indicators to date that partner backup data was compromised. Microsoft notes that an affected app, or even a successful sign-in, doesn’t necessarily mean data was accessed or taken, and advises customers to keep affected app connections disabled until formal restoration instructions are issued, and to review activity from this month where logs allow.

Most everyone in the tech space has been living in interesting times, but this week isn't done yet, and it's already quite special for systems administrators worldwide. They already had to deal with the critical PHP RCE vulnerability, but they also have to update untold amounts of machines and software, thanks to eight insecure intermediate CA certificates that can allow attackers to impersonate any domain and/or pretend their malware is from a legitimate source.

An attacker anywhere in the path of your network traffic, like, say, in a company or government network, public Wi-Fi, your ISP, or one of any number of government entities, can intercept your connection and pretend that they're any website, like apple.com, amazon.com, or bankofamerica.com. If not updated, your operating system and installed software would be none the wiser. Additionally, with the code signing certificates, an application you download can be shown as completely legitimate from, say, Microsoft or Google.

The way that software checks a certificate is legitimate is by verifying its "chain." For example, a website like tomshardware.com has a certificate, issued and signed by an intermediate Certification Authority (or CA, a certificate-selling company), and whose certificate, in turn, is trusted and signed by root certificates — whose exceedingly precious keys are kept offline in safes. In this week's event, Indian CA firm eMudhra issued six TLS and two code-signing intermediate certificates with easily guessable keys.

Your operating system and potentially tens of different applications on your machine all keep a list of which root certificates and CAs are trusted. Browsers also keep a list of those not to trust, called a revocation list. These lists are updated periodically as screw-ups happen, just like the one that took place this week. And now they all need to be updated again, by revoking the eight CAs, removing the one affected root certificate, or just hard-coding a rejection of all eight affected keys.

There's a silver lining: recent versions of Chrome, Brave, Firefox, and Safari all enforce a feature called Certificate Transparency that consults a public read-only log of certificate issuances, and blocks any that aren't mentioned. Google reports that no certificates signed by the six affected intermediate CAs were logged, so if regular web browsing is all you did, you should be safe — but still check all your software for updates nonetheless.

The problem here is the sheer amount of machines and software that needs updating: PCs, servers, operating systems, phones, tablets, routers, web browsers, web browsers wrapped in apps, virtual servers, virtual machines, Docker and other containers, programming languages like Python, Go, Node.js, Rust, standalone download utilities like curl, and probably tens or hundreds of other categories. Additionally, we discussed things that are expected and likely to get updates. Old routers, smart and IoT appliances, and old computers could eventually present a problem.

As for the technical details, eMudhra issued six intermediate CA certificates and two intermediate code-signing certs with rather unadvisable private keys. The private key is the secret half of the two parts of a certificate, and for some reason, those of the aforementioned certs were only 1 byte long — thus a number from 0 to 255, trivial to brute-force in a split second. How the heck that happened is still under investigation.

OpenAI announced in a press release on Oct. 21 that researchers working under its “Patch the Planet” cybersecurity initiative used its AI model GPT-5.6 Sol to uncover critical security vulnerabilities in PHP (an open-source programming language that runs an estimated 70% of the internet). After the discovery, the company says it coordinated a coalition of researchers, PHP maintainers, security providers, and government cybersecurity agencies to fix the issues over two months. The company attributed the lengthy timeline to the task's complexity, which required major changes to the PHP engine.

The PHP Foundation has released patched versions PHP 8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27, and 8.5.12 to fix the vulnerabilities. PHP 8.1 and older versions will not receive official fixes. The coordinated release was originally scheduled for Oct. 22, but was brought forward to Oct. 21 following premature disclosures on Oct. 20, which led to public outcry.

OpenAI says every site using PHP can now safely upgrade its version to stay secure. The company highlights the incident — which it considers one of the biggest cybersecurity discoveries of 2026, given PHP’s ubiquity — as an example of the Defender's Window concept in action. OpenAI introduced the concept after its models hacked Hugging Face; it describes a critical, narrow timeframe during which organizations can use advanced frontier AI models to find, patch, and strengthen their cybersecurity defenses before those same AI-driven attack capabilities become widely available to malicious threat actors.

Operating as part of the Patch the Planet program, researchers from Calif, a California-based cybersecurity firm and the program's founding partner, began auditing PHP with OpenAI tools on July 30, 2026, at the PHP Foundation's request. The Foundation had known about the underlying flaw since 2024 but couldn't identify an exploitation method or a fix. Calif researcher Ryan A. first identified the exploitable vulnerability on Aug. 11, followed by OpenAI researchers that same day. Subsequently, another cybersecurity firm, Wiz, independently identified an additional vulnerability.

The two vulnerabilities, tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, involve flaws in how PHP manages computer memory and handles errors. The first occurs when PHP runs out of allocated memory while processing a request, potentially leaving behind incomplete internal data that the engine may later mistakenly treat as valid. The second involves a related problem in which a fatal error leaves PHP pointing to memory that has already been freed, allowing subsequent requests to access or corrupt it. Under certain conditions, attackers can exploit these weaknesses remotely — without needing login credentials — to execute malicious code on affected servers, potentially taking control of websites.

Using AI, the researchers also demonstrated that the flaws could expose sensitive information stored in server memory, including passwords, authentication tokens, and API keys. Most concerning, the vulnerabilities exist in PHP's core engine, meaning websites can be affected even if their application code has no security flaws. Both vulnerabilities received a critical severity score of 9.2 out of 10.

OpenAI says human developers and security teams examined the underlying code but couldn't fully resolve the flaws, allowing them to persist for two years after discovery. Meanwhile, AI-wielding researchers demonstrated practical ways to exploit it within two weeks. Conversely, one could argue that the flaws would never have been exploitable without AI, making them effectively harmless.

However, OpenAI is challenging this view with its Defender's Window concept. The company argues that powerful, revolutionary technology will inevitably be used by bad actors. It therefore maintains that it is a collective responsibility to act proactively to address any potential exploitable flaws. Anthropic's Claude Mythos recently identified 'thousands of zero-day vulnerabilities' in 'every major operating system and every major web browser.’

A computer, found hidden behind a fridge in a Japanese hotel room, was responsible for sending around 480,000 phishing emails, Hackread reports. The computer was placed there by a Chinese couple who lived locally, and the pair have now been arrested for both the hidden phishing PC and a separate slew of purchases that were made using stolen credit card details. Ye Jiafeng, 39, and his wife, Shen Qi, 39, now face multiple charges including fraudulent obstruction of business and trespass as well as computer fraud.

The scam began on 15 May, 2025, when Ye connected the computer to hotel Wi-Fi and then hid it behind a fridge. There it stayed, sending around 480,000 emails. When it was discovered, the machine had around 2.4 million email addresses, presumably just waiting to be phished. The emails claimed to be from credit card companies and sent unsuspecting recipients to fake websites in an attempt to capture their credit card information. It's believed that the computer was administered remotely, allowing it to remain in situ without any in-person maintenance required.

Ultimately, the computer would likely have remained in place if the recipient of one of the phishing emails hadn't reached out to the hotel. The hotel's IP address was found in metadata linked to the messages, and staff discovered the computer before reporting it to the police. Police are still investigating whether the two scammers were the brains of the operation or simply working for someone else.

While phishing was the couple's chosen scam this time around, it isn't their first foray into using technology to part victims from their cash. Ye and Shen are claimed to have used credit card details stored on a smartphone to buy items in Kobe. But that wasn't the only phone that they had — media reports claim that police found 74 of them at their home, and the couple had spent 10 million yen (around $63,000) of other people's money using stolen card details since 2024. It's unknown whether the phones found by police account for all of those that were used, or if there were others that have yet to be identified.

Phishing has long been a lucrative option for criminals around the globe, but it has also spawned a spin-off industry recently. A China-based phishing-as-a-service operation was dismantled by the FBI earlier this year. The service made it easier for criminals to create scam sites using AI and is believed to have been responsible for almost $2 billion in losses and 3.87 million stolen credit cards.

Modern computing systems and devices typically require pieces of crucial open-source software, typically maintained by unpaid or low-paid volunteers. Recently, a report collated a list of critical open-source projects, noting which of them are chronically underfunded and/or understaffed. The information is sobering: 11 out of 23 of the listed projects currently only have one or two maintainers, and funding is generally scarce and sometimes nonexistent.

The Data Drop's report on open-source maintainers identifies that having only one or two sets of eyes on critical pieces of software means that sooner or later something breaks — and it tends to do so in spectacular fashion, given its ubiquity. So, what happens when these projects, which are widely used across software, go underfunded or understaffed?

Lessons from the past

In 2014, the same year as Heartbleed, Shellshock made waves: a vulnerability in the Bash shell that's present in Linux, macOS, and Unix-type systems. The problem was traced back to a line of code present since 1989, displaying how even software that's thought to have all the bugs hammered out of it can still fall prey to attacks. A quick look at Bash's commit history shows it's almost exclusively maintained by Chet Ramey.

In 2016, ImageMagick was exploited, providing attackers with remote code execution. This library is used for image manipulation across a wide range of software, in webpages, mobile apps, and more. A 2020 analysis revealed that hundreds of security issues had been found over the years in its extensive codebase. Nearly every code contribution in the past couple of years has been done by an individual named Dirk Lemstra.

Contemporary examples include 2021's Log4Shell exploit, a critical vulnerability in the Apache Log4j logging library used in millions of servers. The libwebp image-handling library saw a zero-day vulnerability in 2023, and the xz compression library used across Linux and iOS was compromised in 2024.

Thankless work

Key points in the report mention specific repos, which might be under threat. Somewhat unsurprisingly, the low number of overall maintainers and the unpaid nature of the work make it unattractive to perform.

The main time-zone file used across Linux-based operating systems is maintained pro bono by Paul Eggert, a UCLA teacher. Core-js, a piece of support software that lets new JavaScript work in old browsers and is estimated by the author to be used in half of the busiest websites in the world, is handled by Denis Pushkarev. He once had to endure criticism from the community because he added a command-line message to the library's installer asking for help or a job.

The HarfBuzz library developed by Behdad Esfahbod is a cornerstone in ligatures and text shaping in Middle Eastern languages. In those writings, a letter changes shape and/or orientation according to what's around it. Esfahbod handles that vast majority of the project's code, and doesn't mention public or corporate funding.

Libjpeg-turbo handles JPEG images on Android, Firefox, LibreOffice, and every Chromium-based browser. It's kept ship-shape by D.R. Commander aka DRC, who occasionally is contracted for library-specific work, though at arguably modest values of "3-4 figures rather than 6 or 7." Libxml2, just like the label says, handles XML reading and writing across numerous applications and operating systems. Nick Wellnhofer, the original maintainer, stepped down in September 2025, after years of work with little income.

The SQLite project provides a one-file database that's exceedingly easy to integrate into most software, instead of complicated, resource-heavy databases, while still retaining standard SQL language and accouterments. Thanks to its ease of use, it found its way into an astonishing number of applications. Examples include WhatsApp, Dropbox, Android, Windows, and all major browsers.

The project estimates that there are about a trillion instances of SQLite in use. Just four people keep this critical project together, and they've gone to the length of removing their names and photos from the project's page, as "there are a lot of crazy people in the world who might misuse that information." The project is funded by the offering paid support via the founder's company, though there's no word on effective income, especially when it presumably needs to feed four mouths.

Funding is there, but scarce

It's not all doom and gloom, though. Take curl (the software), for example. Almost every developer has used it, thanks to its URL-fetching abilities and extensive scripting options. The project was started by Daniel Stenberg, who is now paid to work full-time on it. The team has now grown to 11 and has received funding through Open Collective and Germany's Sovereign Tech Agency, among others.

Likely due to the lessons learned from their past respective debacles, both the Log4j and OpenSSL projects are likewise funded by the Sovereign Tech Agency, as are the FFmpeg video file handler and the OpenSSH secure shell software that's ubiquitous in Linux servers.

All things considered, it's easy to argue that the critical importance of all the aforementioned software merits sizable investments from industry players, especially those whose commercial products benefit the most from the community's efforts. Plus, even if the firms feel no moral obligation to contribute, in the day and age where AI agents are finding exploitable vulnerabilities in hours, donations to these open-source projects could also be considered investments.

Millions of dollars worth of gift cards were stolen and then used to buy high-value tech gear at retailers like Target, Sephora, and Lowe's after a Chinese crime ring gained access to an internal Staples system and then used it to issue more than 15,000 cards to itself. While the hack hasn't been made public to date, a 404 Media report notes that it actually took place back in 2023.

The outlet reviewed court records that show that Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) was told about the hack in October of that year. The hack came to light after it led to a search warrant that was unsealed last week. And while the document doesn't specifically name Staples as the victim of the hack, 404 Media has confirmed that it was the company affected based on other information. Such information includes the fact that the victim company is headquartered in Massachusetts, that it uses Blackhawk Networks to fulfill gift card orders, and that the company uses an internal customer support system called Nexus. The report notes that a reference to Nexus can be found on a former Staples executive's LinkedIn profile.

While Staples was under the impression that Nexus could not be accessed from beyond its own network, hackers found that not to be the case. They then "performed multiple heap dump requests," a process that captures all of the data held in an app's memory. That information gave the hackers the tools they needed to hijack logged-in sessions of Staples customer service employees. From there, they were able to issue gift cards at will.

Once the gift cards had been issued, the crime group sent runners to physical retail stores to spend them before they were identified and canceled. Target found that 35 gift cards were used at a New Hampshire store, with high-value products from Apple, Bose, and Beats all bought. All 35 cards were used within a period of just a single hour, although not all of them were obtained via this hack.

In total, Target told investigators that 3,850 gift cards worth over $140,000 were used across 85 different stores in just two days. Sephora was hit for $58,600 worth of sales, while Lowe's saw $226,000 spent across online and in-store purchases. In total, 4,630 stolen gift cards were used with a value of around $425,000.

This hack was just the tip of the iceberg, too. Last April, a Department of Justice announcement confirmed that three Chinese nationals had been sentenced for their part in a gift card fraud conspiracy. Including the Staples hack, the crime group stole more than $100 million worth of gift cards.

Chinese organized crime groups often pop up on the radar of U.S.-based law enforcement. Earlier this year, a Chinese phishing service that was used to generate scam websites using AI was dismantled. The service was linked to almost $2 billion in losses.

When the IETF decided to allow Unicode characters in domain names, many techies saw the move as commendable, but also fraught with danger, as hundreds of unique characters can look similar or identical across multiple alphabets. This can be used for typosquatting attacks, wherein bad actors create functioning websites with deliberately misspelled web addresses that look identical to the real URL, thus launching attacks against unsuspecting visitors who land on the site due to search results generated when the user mistypes an address. The Chromium browser has the most advanced ruleset for finding and preventing mischievous domains masquerading as legitimate ones, but even the best code has odd edge cases, as a blog post from Have I Been Squatted (HIBS) explains in great detail.

Using "аррӏө.com" as an example — which is in fact not identical to the real "apple.com" — the researchers show how specific combinations of characters can still evade multiple layers of protection, thanks to the particular circumstances surrounding the use of specific Cyrillic characters. This alphabet has lookalikes for many Latin letters. For example, а → a, е → e, о → o, р → p, and с → c. We forgive you if you can't spot the differences.

Trying to sneak the one homoglyph into the middle of standard Latin ones triggers Chromium's safeguards and makes the browser display the domain name in its Punycode format. For example, using the Cyrillic "а" with "pple.com" would show up as "xn--pple-43d.com". With few exceptions, domain names with non-Latin characters ending in .com only pass the check if they're all from the same alphabet.

Having said that, opting to try "аррӏе.com," using all Cyrillic lookalikes, would also go bust. Chromium keeps a list of 29 Cyrillic characters that routinely masquerade as their Latin counterparts, and composing a domain name using only characters from that list is a no-no.

So how does "аррӏө.com" pass? Allow us to illustrate with bigger text below. Note how the right-hand Cyrillic character is actually an oval with a line across it.

[e] ≠ [ө]

As you can surmise by now, the "ө" character is not in that special list of 29. While a more recent release of Chromium can and probably will add it, this reveals the difficulty of the problem: since there's no one-size-fits-all solution for detecting typo-squatting, even the best set of rules will sooner or later end up on the wrong side of a corner case.

It takes many watchful eyes to play Unicode Pokémon and catch'em' all, especially given the character set continually evolves and now counts nearly 173,000 entries — though only a subset of those are eligible to be used as domain names or TLDs in practice.

Chromium is reportedly the best browser at detecting domain lookalikes, as a 2020 study showed that it caught 64.1% of the attempts, with Firefox and Safari trailing behind. As a reminder, Chromium underpins the Chrome, Edge, and Brave browsers.

Besides many other rules and per-alphabet verifications, Chromium keeps a list of over 8,000 popular domains bound to be typo-squatted, and runs stronger checks against 836 of them. Domain registries, likewise, make reasonable efforts to prevent typo-squatting, like having strict rules about what characters can go into which TLDs, but that's not nearly enough to fully solve the problem.

All things considered, HIBS recommends that companies afraid of impersonation try to register any lookalike domains and try to encourage passkey use by users. Passkeys are always tied to a specific domain, so a user wouldn't be able to log in to a sneaky website with them.

The FBI has dismantled a major North Korean laptop farm operation in the U.S. with the help of CrowdStrike, which assisted in the identification and disruption of these networks. According to The New York Times, the agency shut down over 40 laptop farms in Texas, resulting in the seizure of over 200 devices. No arrests have been made so far, as the authorities wanted to take down the operations as soon as possible and did not wait for prosecutors to file charges against those involved, although they also warned that they could face criminal penalties if they continue to be involved with remote fraud.

North Korea has been using fake remote workers to earn income despite the economic sanctions placed against the hermit kingdom. It has been reported that it earns around $500 million a year under this scheme, which affects both startups and Fortune 500 companies. Amazon’s IT department actually caught one North Korean infiltrator after it noticed a 110ms keyboard input lag, betraying their distant location.

The U.S. has been clamping down on this scheme since last year, after it shut down 29 North Korean laptop farms across 16 states that were facilitating the employment of North Korean IT workers across over a hundred U.S. companies. Four U.S. citizens and a Ukrainian national were convicted over scams like this in November 2025, with the Justice Department unsealing indictments against two U.S. citizens and 10 China-based North Koreans recently. Prosecutors said that the last group defrauded more than $3 million from 70 companies over a span of six years from 2019, and that the identities of two more individuals involved in the case remain under seal.

Despite the number of networks that U.S. authorities have been able to shut down since last year, CrowdStrike’s Adam Meyers, who’s in charge of the company’s counter adversary operations, says that this scheme is “increasing both in prevalence and complexity.” He noted that it’s difficult to know how truly widespread the problem is and that even though CrowdStrike has identified an average of two new cases daily last month, it was most probably just the tip of the iceberg.

Facilitators are the one crucial aspect that North Korea’s operations rely on. These are people based in the United States who help bypass security measures by hosting the work laptops that companies send to the fraudulent North Korean IT workers to make it appear as if they’re based in the country. While the job looks like easy money from that start, it would eventually become more complicated as the operation progresses. “They get kind of hooked on it initially, and then more gets asked of them, and they’re kind of in too deep at that point,” Meyers told the publication.

A person claiming to be responsible for the recent hack of Denmark’s national registry claimed that they were able to gain access because of an IT company’s weak password. According to The Register, Pays ApS, an IT and data services company that lets customers reference the Danish Central Register of Persons (CPR) was the source of the hack, with the hacker saying that one of the accounts they breached was only protected by a ‘123456’ password.

Copenhagen has confirmed the hack, with a government official saying that the breach was discovered 12 days after it happened when an invoice revealed an unusual amount of activity from the company. The Danish government said that 8.8 million records have been illicitly retrieved, although the hacker claimed that they do not intend to sell or leak the information. While the government did not mention which company the hacker exploited, Pays ApS managing director Sophie Laursen confirmed that the hacker used the company’s access to the database to exfiltrate the data.

This incident shows that a system’s security is only as strong as the weakest link, with the Danish database getting compromised through a third-party user’s poorly chosen password. Given that CPR essentially contains information on virtually every Danish citizen, one would expect that it would require users to at least have a more complicated password, if not two-factor authentication. This isn’t the first time that an incident reveals shortcomings in government database protection, though — Indonesia realized that it had no backups when a ransomware attack in 2024 affected over 230 public agencies, while South Korea lost 858 terabytes of data after a catastrophic fire at a government data center last year.

We expect the Danish government to overhaul its password policies in the near future, especially now that AI is making it easier and more efficient for hackers to hit their targets. Recent incidents like the attacks on South Korean banks and against the Taiwanese government were reportedly conducted with the help of AI agents. Hackers also breached OpenAI using Claude tools, showing just how potent AI has become as a hacking tool in the wrong hands. But with a password like “123456,” potential hackers wouldn’t need to use any AI tools to break into weakly protected systems.

An ongoing cyberattack has reportedly struck major supermarket chains across Europe, disrupting refrigeration control systems. The attack — which has reportedly seen units set to continuously defrost at 50 degrees Celsius — is also apparently affecting deliveries and in-store pricing powered by electronic shelf labels, La Dépêche reports.

According to the report, "several" major retailers have been targeted by a cyberattack, which has hit Danfoss-made refrigeration controls used by French supermarkets Intermarché, Leclerc, and Coopérative U. Indeed, the latter's president, Dominique Schelcher, has confirmed as of Monday morning that "A cyberattack has been affecting the refrigeration production facilities of several stores in our network since last night." Schelcher said teams had been mobilized to fix the issue and promised an investigation into the incident, which he described as "extremely serious."

The report states the units have had their automatic defrosting systems activate, but that hackers have also configured the function — which normally runs for just two hours a day — into a continuous, forced defrosting cycle with the temperature set to a toasty 50 degrees Celsius. Sources reportedly described "a wave of heat" escaping from fridges and freezers

Early reports indicate losses are already approaching 300,000 euros, but could run into several million euros nationwide. Separately, NOS in the Netherlands reports that several supermarket chains have been hit with a malfunction due to a cybersecurity incident on Sunday afternoon. Albert Heijn, Etos, and Gall & Gall have had their websites taken down, impacting deliveries. Electronic shelf labels have also been compromised, disrupting in-store pricing. "We have immediately taken measures to protect our IT environment. Part of this involves the preventive temporary shutdown of a number of systems," Albert Heijn said in a statement.

It is unclear at this stage whether the two attacks are related or how widespread either of them is. Belgium's Delhaize chain, which belongs to Albert Heijn, has also reported disruption. Images online show stores in Amsterdam warning customers about price problems, and the suspension of loyalty programs that have also been impacted by the incident.

A YouTuber has received an unexpected visit from the police over an automatic license plate recognition (ALPR) camera he built to specifically track police cars, using the same technology law enforcement has infamously used to track ordinary citizens. In a video posted to his channel on October 7, Anthony Sistilli says two police officers showed up at his doorstep on September 20th to ask questions about the device, asking what his intentions were with the project.

Sistilli, a Canadian software engineer and YouTuber, pointed out the irony of the officers' concerns, explaining that they mirror the privacy concerns of ordinary citizens who are growing increasingly weary of the recent spike in blanket surveillance brought about by a mass installation of ALPR cameras. Flock Safety, a U.S. public safety technology company, recently scaled its centralized national surveillance network to over 120,000 cameras operating across 49 states, according to the company, capturing billions of vehicle scans every month.

The development sparked widespread public backlash, with critics arguing that Flock has quietly built a massive government surveillance dragnet without a public vote or federal oversight, since any police department on the network can search across state lines. Security researchers later discovered the network included 335,701 Flock cameras and created a “Flock Surveillance Map,” exposing their locations.

Similar ALPR camera surveillance networks exist in Canada, where Sistilli resides, prompting him to build his own device, but this time, encoded to exclusively track police cars. He detailed the build in several TikTok videos, describing it as “a personal Flock surveillance camera to Flock the Flockers.” He then posted a video of himself using the device in real life. The video brought Peel Regional Police, the local law enforcement serving Sistilli’s city, Brampton, Ontario, to his doorstep two weeks later.

“One of them [the officers] took the time to specifically mention how scary it would be for them, because people would be able to find out where they lived, when they got on their shift and what they were doing throughout the day, and that that type of powerful information could put them personally at risk for any bad apples that might want to track them down,” Sistilli narrated. He went on to point out that these were the exact concerns ordinary citizens had about constant surveillance, suggesting there should be more policies and systems around such networks. The officers reportedly responded that there was probably no effective way to implement this without giving away details of active investigations to criminals.

After several investigative reports exposed incidents where officers misused Flock’s database, with instances of stalking of exes and their acquaintances, public backlash snowballed into physical resistance that has seen residents covering or destroying the cameras. Several municipalities, including major hubs like Los Angeles and Fullerton, have now suspended or outright canceled their Flock contracts due to constituent privacy concerns.

Flock and its proponents insist the network has helped lower crime, a claim critics say misreads the data. Sistilli’s video also details aggressive, arguably deceptive marketing tactics Flock uses to convince municipalities to accept cameras. Another issue is centered around the collection and handling of the data. The company says its cameras are protected by on-device encryption and only briefly store images before they are forwarded to its servers. However, hackers reportedly extracted over 27,000 clips and 1.6 million images, captured in a span of 21 days, from a stolen Flock camera.

Over 3,400 “victim servers” were hit by cryptomining malware PoeLLM during a campaign named Canto Incognito, tracked since April 2026, Lumen’s cybersecurity research team Black Lotus Labs reports. The malware’s “command-and-control (C2) mechanism” used address encoding through four words in a two-stanza poem on GitHub, altered 11 times so far, to direct affected hosts to new C2 servers. Most of those hit look to be running “vulnerable versions of open-source AI/LLM services, such as LiteLLM and Ollama,” despite an April LiteLLM fix that probably patched the exploitation path.

The malware’s payload consists of XMRig and Iron miners, connected to Kryptex mining infrastructure, with infected servers becoming scanners and exploit servers. The “primary commonality amongst the first 900 victims” was contact with “an endpoint for the Russian crypto mining service,” Lumen says. This indicates that it may be financially motivated. “AI infrastructure is becoming an attractive target” because exposed AI services may contain valuable data and hardware access, especially GPUs. In the meantime, it has “blocked all traffic to and from the PoeLLM C2 servers.”

The primary targets are LiteLLM, a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs, a way companies can route their apps to many models through one endpoint, and Gotenberg, a Docker-based API for PDF conversion, which has a guide warning not to expose it to the internet. Also hit are Ollama, which allows you to run open-weight models on your own hardware, although it is not internet-exposed by default, and Gitea, a self-hosted Git platform. Ivanti Sentry, an enterprise gateway appliance, “may also have been targeted,” and one instance was how Lumen discovered the campaign.

Although the malware’s methodology involves leveraging poetry, this is only for pointing the infected servers to the C2 server. It is not a form of an AI jailbreak through harmful requests or prompt injection, or what is known as “adversarial poetry,” described in a paper last year.

The poem, “On the Nature of Connection,” was first committed in April, with each new version pointing to a new C2 server. The malware is able to decode the new address by pulling specific words and converting them into an IPv4 address. Lumen says that “the malware creator has not changed the pattern used in deciphering the poem” at the time of reporting. Using a poem likely aided in obfuscation as it is “a perfect vehicle for hiding an important message,” the researchers told The Register.

The malware is “deployed through vulnerability exploitation of publicly exposed services,” with broad scanning beginning in May. For LiteLLM, a crafted POST to the connection endpoint “was likely the exploitation path,” based on a flaw where two endpoints would run a supplied command on the host with no role check (CVE-2026-42271), which CISA added to its list of exploited vulnerabilities in June. Lumen didn’t detail the methods for Ollama, Gotenberg, and Gitea.

If you want to check your own systems, look at connection logs for the indicators of compromise listed on Lumen’s GitHub page. Be sure to audit external exposure when installing any open-source tool and close unnecessary ports. Patch any and all network devices. Follow the individual advisories for the vulnerable products — LiteLLM 1.83.7 or later and Ivanti Sentry R10.5.2, R10.6.2, or R10.7.1.

When Lumen published its report, three of the 12 C2 servers were still active and the campaign “continues to infect new victims.” The firm “will continue to monitor for new traffic.” More attacks like this seem likely: Lumen says enterprise attack surfaces are “expanding rapidly as AI infrastructure grows.”

Cyberattacks using AI agents against several of the largest South Korean banks, including Hana Bank, KB Kookmin Bank, and Shinhan Bank, are currently being investigated by South Korean authorities. According to The New York Times, at least 25,000 Shinhan Bank customers had their personal credit information leaked last week, while 99 customers and 20 current or former employees of Kookmin Bank have been affected. 89 Hana Bank customers were also affected by the hacks, which led to their information being stolen.

South Korea’s National Office of Investigation is looking at all three cases, which has also caught the attention of President Lee Jae Myung. The South Korean president said that there were signs that the hackers behind these incidents used AI models, “causing considerable public concern and anxiety,” and that he has instructed his cabinet to confirm the situation and to ensure that the damage from these incidents is minimized. “It’s now become possible to use AI to hack with ease even without specialized skills,” Lee said during the livestreamed cabinet meeting.

AI models are becoming more powerful with every release, and bad actors are taking advantage of them to find weaknesses in secure systems and exploit them. Anthropic reported the first instance of an AI-orchestrated cyberattack in November 2025, which was allegedly orchestrated by a Chinese state-sponsored group. A few months after that, a cybersecurity firm said that Taiwan was targeted by the first-ever end-to-end autonomous cyberattacks by China-linked hackers. Even AI labs that built these AI models aren’t immune from the AI-powered hacks, as security researchers breached OpenAI using Claude and gained access to its internal codebase.

There has been no indication yet of who’s behind the attacks on South Korea’s banking industry — speculation may focus on Seoul’s regional adversaries, but it can be difficult to trace and attribute hacks, especially if the actors know how to cover their tracks. Aside from that, AI agents are known to conduct unintentional cyberattacks on their own, with the Australian government complaining that it took OpenAI 84 days to inform it of a hacking incident involving Australia’s national health portal.

While the leading AI labs are believed to be putting safeguards in place to help prevent their models from being used in illegal and unethical ways, some hackers exploit hallucinations and trick AI agents into running malware. Aside from that, many open-weight and open-source models lack similar guardrails, making it easier for hackers to use them in their activities. While AI models haven’t replaced skilled attackers yet, they have made planning, reconnaissance, and attack execution so much easier and could serve as a force multiplier, allowing hackers to act more quickly and efficiently.

An Iranian-Turkish Man has been extradited to the U.S. from Montenegro over his alleged involvement in a $3.4 billion hacking scheme that affected numerous universities and companies across the country. The extradition, a rare move involving an individual accused of state-sponsored attacks, took place on October 1. According to a CNN report, Montenegrin police arrested the suspect, Amir Barati, in June at the FBI’s request.

The suspect and 16 other Iranians were indicted on wire and computer fraud charges in August, and are expected to face the charges in the U.S. Southern District of New York. According to the indictment, the 17 defendants are members of Mabna Institute — an Iran-based company known for state-backed global hacking activities.

In a campaign that began in 2013 and lasted several years, the defendants allegedly stole over 31 terabytes of academic data and intellectual property and breached 8,000 email accounts belonging to professors in the U.S. and worldwide. The attack affected 144 universities, 42 private companies, and five government agencies, including the Department of Labor and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. It also affected 178 universities and 11 companies abroad, as well as at least two NGOs, causing over $3.4 billion in losses and damages.

The attackers reportedly handed over the stolen data and illicit access to the Iranian government, after which it was used to benefit Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other Iranian organizations and universities. Barati specifically allegedly “helped track the progress of the hacks of universities and helped create ‘targeting lists' for the private sector,” according to U.S. court documents.

The suspect’s extradition is a rare case, as accused Iranian hackers rarely ever face U.S. courts, and is widely seen as a win for law enforcement. Iran’s sizable hacking capabilities have caused considerable damage globally. In August, the country was suspected of conducting cyberattacks on U.S. water suppliers in 45 municipalities. Similarly, an Iranian-linked hacking group claimed an attack in March that wiped over 200,000 devices clean and extracted over 50 TB of data.

A “crafted VPN client configuration file” uploaded by the user or a logged-in attacker via an Asus router’s web management interface can allow an adversary to “execute arbitrary commands,” a critical security risk the company has acted to patch. A second, separate bug, which uses debug code left active, allows the attacker to bypass security checks in order to enable Telnet and may allow commands to be run “with root privileges,” potentially affecting devices connected to the router.

Asus recommends that users “only import VPN client configuration files from trusted sources.” The two CVEs, CVE-2026-14157 and CVE-2026-13313, score 9.4 and 8.9 out of 10 on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) 4.0 scale, which measures vulnerability severity. Asus names firmware series rather than models: 3.0.0.6_102 for both bugs, with the 3.0.0.4_386 and 3.0.0.4_388 series also affected by the Telnet one.

The routers can act as a VPN client when set up with a configuration file from a VPN provider. Things go wrong when crafted text inside the uploaded files is read as formatting instructions rather than plain data. VPNs are commonly used to bypass filters and access otherwise unreachable content, but the risk here applies to owners who import VPN configuration files into the router itself, not to VPN apps on a laptop or phone.

The separate Telnet flaw relies on enabling the service first before running commands that could impact the network. Besides the firmware update, Asus recommends a strong, unique admin password with “at least 10 characters, with a mix of uppercase letters, numbers, and symbols.” To reduce risk in the meantime, Asus also advises against running “scripts, tools, or commands from untrusted sources on any device within your local network.” One risk is that “attackers may use social engineering to trick administrators,” the company says.

The VPN bug uses the same entry point as one disclosed by VulnCheck in 2024, CVE-2024-0401, which used a crafted OVPN profile. That makes Asus’s config file import, specifically through the web admin page, a recurring weak point. As a popular brand, Asus is also a likely target. The AyySSHush campaign utilized authentication bypasses, brute-force logins, and a command-injection flaw (CVE-2023-39780) to backdoor over 9,000 routers, as we reported at the time. The backdoor was even able to survive firmware updates.

With the two router fixes came one for 13 motherboards, where a “physically proximate attacker” could “read or write arbitrary system memory by inserting a specially crafted device.” This flaw impacts many of Asus’s Z390 and C246 motherboards and is rated high severity at 7.0 out of 10, lower than the router flaws. It also requires physical access.

If you are at risk or potentially at risk, find the firmware update on Asus’s support page or your product’s page. For the affected motherboards, the fix is BIOS version 1502 for the WS Z390 Pro and 2203 for the other 12 boards. Routers that have reached end of life will not receive new firmware. For those, Asus advises the user to use strong, unique login and Wi-Fi passwords.

There's a private information leak most days, usually by way of misconfigured services or nasty security bugs. Sometimes, though, users will readily hand over private information without being aware of it. That's the case for over 300 organizations, including several Fortune 500 companies and a frontier AI lab, who collectively had 13,000+ private screenshots exposed — all thanks to their development AI agents being arguably too good at their jobs and performing them with little human oversight.

Besides showing pictures of internal and pre-release software, the leaked screenshots reportedly include corporate and client information, financial data, and even screen recordings for a money-movement interface. The report, called PixelLeak, comes from endpoint security firm Glow, and it details how the leaks happened. The root cause is surprisingly simple and likely to induce a forehead slap.

It's become customary in development work related to UI and UX (and other categories) to include screenshots showing previews or before/after comparisons of tweaked features, for review purposes. Said images travel as attachments to the respective code changes, also known as "pull requests" (PRs) in dev parlance.

When using GitHub (and potentially other code repository services), humans see a graphical interface for easily attaching an image to a PR. Meanwhile, bots are limited to using the command-line interface, which currently does not have that feature available for private repositories.

As the efficient and smart agents they are, the clankers came up with a simple solution: publish the PR as usual to the private repository, and include an image placeholder linking to a file that's hosted in a public repository instead. There, problem fixed! The user is happy and likely has no idea what happened unless they notice the problem somehow and start asking the bot some hard questions.

Glow says that in about a third of the affected companies, developers were using gitshot, a command-line tool for attaching screenshots, used in this instance to overcome the aforementioned limitation. Searching for images attached by the tool is quite easy, as one needs but look for the "_gitshot" tag. The report also indicates that in 93% of cases, images were found in repositories under direct control of the developer's username, rather than being tied to the company's GitHub account.

In one particular case, an agent skill (essentially long-winded prompts instructing a bot how to do something) was also an indirect source of leaked information. The agents started incorporating the image hosting workaround as a skill, and after a while, many of them were using it for every development ticket, leading to leaks of information about features months away from public release.

Glow provided sample reasoning output from an agent, explaining precisely why it uploaded the screenshots publicly:

"internal_sweeper is private, and GitHub cannot render images from a private repo in a PR description — its image proxy fetches anonymously, so anything committed here (branch, release asset, whatever) shows up broken for reviewers. The only way to satisfy both "reviewers see the images" and "nothing but index.html in the repo" was to host the PNGs elsewhere, so I created a new public repo, sweeper-demo/pr-assets, holding the two screenshots pinned to a commit SHA."

As mitigation measures, Glow first recommends checking that employees don't use repositories under their own accounts, auditing the accounts and code managed by employees no longer associated with the company, and curtailing the use of "shadow AI" — when employees unadvisedly sign up for their own AI tools without talking to IT first and neatly punch planet-sized holes in the firm's security and data privacy.

Additionally, Glow advises strong vetting of software and code libraries used for development, as well as careful reading of the instructions and rules of any agentic skills.

The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) experienced a data breach between October 2025 and July 2026, allowing unauthorized users to access and potentially exfiltrate data on 2.76 million records relating to living personnel, and an additional 294,000 records relating to deceased individuals. According to ABC News, some of the exposed information included Social Security numbers and the job details of both military and civilian personnel.

“A Defense Manpower Data Center information system experienced unauthorized access of personally identifiable information by a small number of unauthorized users between October 2025 and July 2026. Upon discovery, DMDC immediately remediated the vulnerability,” a U.S. defense official said in a statement. However, they also added that there hasn’t been any evidence of misuse of the compromised data at this time.

DMDC serves as the Pentagon’s central personnel database, storing information on active-duty and reserve members of the military, as well as civilian employees, contractors, retirees, veterans, and even military family members, and holds over 60 million records in its care. This makes any breach of its system potentially significant, putting the privacy and personal security of those affected at risk. But because the repository also lists the roles and job details of the affected personnel, it could also reveal the identities of people assigned to sensitive positions related to national security.

While it might be good news that there haven’t been any signs that the exposed information has been exploited, it could also mean that whoever was behind the breach is just sitting on the data for later use. The Pentagon also did not mention who was behind the hack, nor did it mention how it discovered the vulnerability.

Given that most governments rely on digital infrastructure for their day-to-day operations, one can expect that their adversaries, and sometimes even their allies, are always probing and looking for vulnerabilities in their systems. Chinese hackers reportedly breached the U.S. Treasury Department in early 2025, even going as far as hacking the Treasury Secretary’s PC. More recently, the CanisterWorm malware has spread and wiped Iranian machines for no reason, while the Middle Eastern country also claimed that Western-made routers from Cisco and others failed just as the U.S. and Israel began their bombing campaign against it during the first quarter of this year. At the same time, U.S. authorities released a warning that Iranian hackers are targeting Siemens controllers in a bid to sabotage critical infrastructure.

Even though the Pentagon claims it has already fixed the issue and stopped further information from leaking through this vulnerability, it cannot change exposed information like Social Security numbers and employment histories. This means that the affected people would need to remain more vigilant against criminals, intelligence services, and other threat actors long after this incident fades from the news cycle. And if an affected individual is in a sensitive position relating to national security, it's going to take more than a year of free credit monitoring to keep them safe.

Blockchain-assisted cyberattacks have risen more than fivefold since last year, driven largely by North Korean and Iranian nation-state actors and Russian-speaking criminal groups, according to a report by blockchain data and intelligence platform Chainalysis. Rather than storing malicious payloads on servers that are susceptible to disruption, the attackers store them on public, censorship-immune blockchains. The technique, named Blockchain Dead Drops (BDD), stores payloads in on-chain transactions and smart contracts where infected devices can retrieve them on demand.

What makes BDD particularly dangerous is that it gives cyberattack campaigns unprecedented durability. Because blockchain data is public, immutable, and replicated worldwide, takedowns become immensely difficult. Threat actors can use this resilient infrastructure for command and control without worrying about losing the layer to domain seizures, repository removals, hosting takedowns, and additional disruptions.

The report notes that the widespread availability of Chinese open-source AI tools has significantly lowered the technical barrier to entry for cybercrime. Meaning that less-experienced attackers can now launch complex cyberattacks, which is linked to a reported 440% rise in BDD attacks.

Understanding the Blockchain Dead Drops technique

While blockchain dead drops vary across cyberattack campaigns, attackers typically store either malware payloads or dynamic command-and-control (C2) configuration pointers on the blockchain itself. In C2 setups, the on-chain data does not carry out the attack. Instead, it holds configuration information, such as domains, IP addresses, or other pointers, that direct compromised devices to the attacker’s current infrastructure. Malware on the victim's machine retrieves and decodes this data, which then connects to the real C2 server off-chain, where subsequent commands and malicious activity take place.

In payload-delivery setups, attackers store malicious code or encrypted payload components on-chain for victim machines to retrieve and execute locally. In both cases, once the malware has what it needs, the operation moves off-chain, where the attacker executes the actual compromise, which, depending on the campaign, can mean infostealers targeting crypto wallets and credentials, or remote access trojans that give attackers persistent control over systems.

Chainalysis identified several techniques threat actors use to hide malware on-chain, primarily using transaction-based storage and contract-based storage. In transaction-based storage, attackers publish C2 configurations, payload references, or infrastructure pointers inside blockchain transactions for malware to retrieve later, embedding the data in fields such as memos or calldata. This can occur on a single chain or spread across several blockchains.

On the other hand, contract-based storage uses smart contracts as resilient storage for the same kinds of data, with the contract's state holding the current C2 pointer. This is the model behind EtherHiding, where malware queries the contract for up-to-date information, while the attackers' visible on-chain activity is typically limited to deploying and periodically updating the contract.

Beyond these two approaches, threat actors continue to develop new, less detectable ways to hide malicious data on-chain. One such technique involves “phantom wallets”, blockchain addresses that have no corresponding private key. Instead of placing their C2 server's IP address in a transaction or smart contract, attackers encode it directly into the bytes of the wallet address itself, then send zero-value transactions to that address. Malware on the victim's machine is programmed to decode the IP address from the phantom wallet and connect to the attacker's C2 server.

Nation-state actors are driving a surge in attacks

The BDD technique has been around for over a decade. One of the earliest instances was in 2013, when a Necurs botnet variant stored its C2 domain info on Namecoin, a Bitcoin fork. Then, in 2019, attackers encoded C2 IP addresses for banking malware into Bitcoin transactions. That same year, Glupteba crypto-mining botnet stored malicious info in Bitcoin’s OP_RETURN field.

EtherHiding, the implementation of BDD on EVM chains, began in Mid-2023, following Cloudflare crackdowns that blocked their infostealer malware distribution servers. The ClearFake malware crew moved malicious code into smart contracts on the BNB Smart Chain. This allowed the campaign to keep going, as the chain couldn't be taken offline. Within days, other groups began testing ways to replicate the move, and by late December 2023, the Smargaft DDoS botnet was also using smart contract-based C2 on BSC.

State-level actors entered the scene in 2024, when Iranian actors linked to the country's Ministry of Intelligence first embedded C2 data in Bitcoin transactions. By 2025, North Korean actors began using EtherHiding in fake job interview campaigns. Since then, daily malicious blockchain writes have increased from 2.06 to 11.1, a 440% increase that Chainalysis attributes to AI. Before the launch of powerful open-weight Chinese LLMs — which can be uncensored through a process known as abliteration — building effective BDDs required substantial cybersecurity and crypto experience. Now, far less experienced threat actors can deploy BDDs easily.

Tracking BDD activity across five major blockchains and over a dozen named malware strains, Chainalysis reports that by Q2 2026, “state-actor-linked groups were responsible for roughly two-thirds of new BDD activity each quarter, and half of total BDD activity,” despite only just entering the scene in mid-2024. The campaigns are being perpetrated by Iranian, North Korean, and Russian-speaking operators.

Circumventing blockchain dead drops

A seemingly obvious fix, blocking blockchain traffic, is out of the question. For example, cutting off Ethereum access would mean blocking every public RPC endpoint that providers such as Cloudflare and Alchemy run. This would also impact legitimate wallets and DeFi services. Even then, the attackers could just go back to running their own nodes off-chain. Similarly, restricting what can be written to a public blockchain at the protocol level is impractical, as the fundamental changes this would require would likely cause more harm than the malware.

This leaves detection, identifying the attackers, and disrupting the off-chain parts of the operation as the only viable options. In this case, the same blockchain properties that make BDD attractive to attackers work against them. Every time an operator rotates infrastructure by publishing a new transaction or updating a contract, the change is permanently recorded and timestamped on a public ledger. By tracing operator wallets, resolver contracts, funding sources, and update histories, investigators can link seemingly unrelated campaigns back to the same actors.

For organizations, one practical early-warning signal is outbound JSON-RPC traffic to public blockchain endpoints, particularly from machines with no legitimate reason to query a blockchain. A workstation or build server reading data from a smart contract should probably sound some warning bells. The technique also maps to an existing MITRE ATT&CK entry, T1102.001 (Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver), giving security teams an established framework for building detections.

In the case of individuals, it's important to note that BDD comes into play only after something malicious is already running on a device. The blockchain tells the malware where to go next, but it doesn't get the malware onto the machine in the first place. North Korea's fake job interview campaigns, for example, still require developers to first download and run malicious code. Therefore, being wary of unsolicited outreach — especially when it involves coding tests that require running unfamiliar repositories — remains the first and most effective line of defense.

What do you get when you cross a bored teenager with free time and excellent computer skills? A hack of a Microsoft database with trillions of records on hand and 25,000 records of employee data, of course. Future legend hacker Faav poked around Microsoft's supposedly internal Titan analytics platform, eventually finding that its user validation was... sub-optimal.

According to Faav, he's "spent the year hacking Microsoft off and on around school," digging up bugs on the Redmond firm's wares as well as Amazon, Google, Adobe, and others. Much like other hackers, he has his own set of tools, and predictably in this day and age, his sonic screwdriver is Antares, an AI orchestrator bot he concocted for the purpose of scanning and automating boring security legwork.

Antares found an endpoint URL in Titan that brought up an error message saying that a VPN was required. Just like a virtual pspspsps, this was enough to get Faav's attention. He got Antares to look for subdomains around this endpoint, coming up with one belonging to an Azure Cloud host, along with a corresponding Swagger/OpenAPI file listing four routes (Swagger is an industry-standard machine-readable instruction on how an API works, for easier third-party integration).

While three of those routes needed Azure Active Directory authentication, one did not, and its name was inspiring: /v2/Query. It also accepted raw SQL queries, prompting a collective facepalm from the audience. Faav still needed to know what to query for, and after clever usage of the Wayback Machine, he found a 2023 version of this login page, complete with a helpful Apache Superset configuration file describing the database schema, showing 56 table definitions.

He also found that this endpoint refused his queries due to the lack of a JWT (JSON Web Token) authentication, so he sicced Antares on it again for 10 days, with no success. Eventually, Faav had a flash of inspiration and realized that the way the server was responding implied that the token's digital signature wasn't being checked. So he just pretended his access token was for an administrator and was promptly let in. One handy "SHOW DATABASES" later, he was staring at 25,000 records of employee data, along with organization records, dashboards, and charts.

After exploring the database a little more, he found a particular data source for Bing analytics. Digging there and tallying up rows across tables, Faav saw he had access to a total of 17 trillion records total, and had to double-check this number and stop himself from yelling out and waking his parents at 2 am.

After reporting the problem to Microsoft's bug bounty program, he was awarded with $5,000 for his findings. In his blog post, he also points out that "AI and human intuition compounded here. Antares did ten days of work I didn’t have to [...] Its persistence, plus one human hunch, is what made this find possible."

A security researcher discovered a vulnerability in Flock’s website that gave him an access token without needing login credentials. The researcher used the information gleaned to build a map of Flock cameras and share it on a website he named the Flock Surveillance Map, which now lists the location of 335,701 cameras. Flock has now issued a trademark infringement complaint with the goal of having the researcher close the website.

According to The Intercept, Joshua Michael used this to query ArcGIS, a third-party mapping and geospatial layer that Flock uses, to retrieve a database of Flock devices in November 2025.

Michael said that he immediately informed the company about the security flaw. He said in his email, dated Nov. 13, 2025, that “all testing was strictly non-intrusive, limited to open unauthenticated endpoints, and did not involve bypassing authentication, modifying data, or invoking any billable ArcGIS or Google operations.” However, the company did not reply to his message, and it took him two more attempts before a representative responded. Flock said in its response, “Thank you for the findings. We are internally triaging them and will reach back out with next steps soon,” but the researcher said that the company still hasn’t replied to this day.

Flock apparently fixed the vulnerability in January of this year after Michael published his findings, but the researcher was able to exfiltrate a Flock device location database before that. This information has allowed him to build the Flock Surveillance Map website, which lists 335,701 cameras, presumably updated in December 2025.

The surveillance company said that it has never been hacked, that Flock information has never been leaked, and that the Flock Safety cloud platform “has never experienced a data breach,” but Michael says that this does not reflect reality. He told The Intercept that it made this announcement “after I pulled their database of devices.” “That leaves two possibilities,” said the researcher. “Either they knew and chose not to disclose it for fear of bad press, or they didn’t know I exfiltrated the data at all. The first is a transparency failure. The second is a detection failure with national security implications.”

This issue once again raises questions about the company’s cybersecurity and privacy measures. Hackers have recently discovered that the Flock cameras stored encryption keys directly on the device, which allowed them to extract more than 27,000 clips stored and find that it has taken more than 1.6 million images in a span of 21 days. There were also multiple instances of misuse, in which police officers used the system to stalk romantic partners, while a car reviewer was “ambushed” in a store parking lot and detained for an hour for a mistyped police report.

What’s more alarming was that Michael pointed out that the ubiquity of the system and the vulnerabilities he uncovered so far show that it could be used to track personnel. Soldiers and civilians working in the defense industry could potentially be observed going to and from 22 sensitive sites, including Eglin AFB, CIA Headquarters, FBI Headquarters, Joint Base Andrews, and even the Pentagon, with people living within a 20-mile radius of these sites having a 57.22% to 93.94% chance of passing a Flock camera and getting recorded in the system.

While Flock did not comment on The Intercept’s reporting before publication, Michael noted that he received a trademark infringement complaint on his site. Doppel, a cybersecurity company focusing on social engineering defense, reached out on behalf of the surveillance company and said that he’s using the trademark “FLOCK SAFETY” without authorization and that it may confuse its customers. Because of this, the firm requested that the Flock Surveillance Map website be taken down, despite a pop-up that appears on the website when accessed for the first time saying otherwise.

Factoring attacks against the RSA algorithm were generally considered infeasible, but that may change dramatically if the findings in a paper from UC San Diego (California) and Inria Nancy (France) prove correct after peer review. The paper outlines a new attack that breaks RSA in record time. That's concerning because RSA-based encryption was in use for quite some time, and although it's been generally deprecated in favor of ECC and post-quantum algorithms, it's still employed today in a substantial portion of services.

Assuming the research holds up and the attack conditions are met, the number of necessary operations for cracking an RSA-encrypted key (and thus, inspecting network traffic encrypted with it) drops dramatically. (From 2⁸⁰, 2¹¹², 2¹²⁸, and 2¹⁴⁴ down to 2⁶⁵, 2⁹⁰, 2¹⁰⁵, and 2¹¹⁹ — for 1024, 2048, 3072-, and 4096-bit key lengths, respectively.)

Even for the 1024-bit keys, performing 2⁶⁵ calculations is still a lot, but it starts getting into the range where it's feasible for an entity with large resources at their disposal, like a number of state actors. Crucially, the paper indicates that the algorithms the team used are far from optimized and could hypothetically be significantly sped up after optimization passes, potentially with the help of AI tools and by leveraging GPUs for the task.

The attack only works against the textbook (or "raw") variant of RSA, which isn't widely used for commonplace computing like website certificates and remote access, but is nevertheless present in services like Cloudflare Privacy Pass, iCloud Private Relay, and Private Cloud Compute. Equipment and services using PKCS #11, like many smart cards, USB security tokens, code-signing pipelines, hardware security (HSM) and trusted platform (TPM) modules also use this variation. But fulfilling the attack conditions is much easier said than done.

In order to reach a point where an attacker can decipher data, they first must perform an exceedingly high number of queries against the key they're attacking, collecting enough data points from the key's oracle. In practical terms, this often means repeatedly poking a live server that's using that key to encrypt traffic, billions of times over, though it can also be done against a standalone hardware device.

In the practical context of an encryption algorithm, an oracle takes a number in, runs it through a computation involving a private key, and spits it back out, without revealing its key. The textbook variant of RSA under attack here lets the oracle be queried with any number, thus allowing the attacker to collect enough data points to perform the mathematical wizardry described in the paper. They can then proceed to throw a lot of computing power to ultimately inspect whichever traffic they captured that was using that same encryption key.

As network administrators have certainly figured out by now, running billions of queries against a live service is almost guaranteed to earn them an IP ban, among other measures. It's a reasonable assumption that entities like Cloudflare and Apple have those kinds of controls in place. Still, not everyone does, especially in the case of key management services that aren't closely monitored, including hardware-based ones. The scientists worked their magic on Thales Luna HSMs, in both hardware and online service form.

Although the bar for a practical application of this attack remains quite high, the key finding is that it may be significantly lowered. This opens the possibility that oracle data collected today may be used to decrypt saved traffic in a matter of weeks or months, especially in the near future as hardware advances. It's also possible that other scientists can take this idea and expand on it, finding additional flaws.

If you bought anything on Asus' web store, you should check your inbox. The company has reported that its online shop suffered a data breach, and that contact details and order records "may have been accessed."

Asus says that no payment or financial information was revealed. However, Asus is not saying how large the breach was, or which regions had records leaked. The firm only indicates "part of the Asus eShop environment," a statement that is quite vague. Since the eShop is segregated by region and country, there's also no word on which locations were affected.

No information was offered on the duration of the breach or who may be behind the attack. There is no publicly posted statement, except for what people who have received the email have shown.

Asus says it "promptly took steps" to contain the breach, and that it has not identified any ongoing access. The firm also states that an investigation is in progress, and is advising customers to be extra careful, as the leaked information could be used to convincingly impersonate Asus and used for phishing attacks. For example, someone claiming to be from Asus may reach out about a recent order and offer your name, address, and order information as proof they're legitimate.

Anyone with compromised credentials should keep an eye out for unexpected emails, phone calls, SMS, or online messages claiming to be from Asus. Don't click any links or scan any QR codes contained in those messages — be sure to manually visit the websites in question in your browser.

Likewise, don't hand out any personal info or passwords during any phone calls, much less accept any requests for remote access software unless you are fully aware you're speaking to actual support. As always, be sure to enable two-factor authentication (aka 2FA or MFA) so that thieves can't access your accounts even if they hold your password.

Security agencies in Japan, the U.S., Australia, and Germany warned that the North Korean “WaterPlum” cyber actor group has been installing malware on applicants to fake job postings and stealing their credentials and cryptocurrency holdings. The advisory [PDF] says more than 30,000 devices across 100 countries have already been infected and more than 7,000 cryptocurrency wallets have been compromised, leading to losses of $10.71 million.

It’s believed the stolen cryptocurrency was funneled to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) government, which also uses fake IT personnel working at legitimate companies to net $500 million annually. The operation also steals credentials and personal data, which it later uses to apply for openings at Western companies. Amazon has seen an example of this in late 2025, with over 1,800 suspected North Korean applications blocked by the company since April 2024.

The attacks occur when fake recruiters ask legitimate applicants to complete coding assignments and other tests to evaluate their skills. However, these often have hidden malware that gives the attackers access to the victim’s computer. These persistent remote access trojans (RATs) allow the WaterPlum group to access an infected system even months after the interview. Since the compromised computer is likely the same device that the targeted applicant will use once they get a legitimate job at another company, it could also be used by the North Koreans as a springboard to attack the systems of and steal credentials from their future clients.

International agencies say these fake recruiters often target software developers and IT professionals with attractive openings, using the names of legitimate AI, cryptocurrency, and NFT companies and posting openings on online job platforms, social media, gig work platforms, and freelance marketplaces. These fake IT workers and similar schemes are used by the hermit kingdom to generate revenue, especially since it has been largely excluded from the wider international economy due to sanctions.

Many companies are aware of this and are taking steps to protect themselves against similar tactics, but it’s probably harder for individual users who are simply looking for opportunities online to do so. Potential applicants can protect themselves by applying only directly with the company and on legitimate platforms, and if they’re unsure about an opening, they should contact the company directly to confirm its legitimacy. If they decide to go to an interview, it would also be wise to set up an isolated virtual machine just for that purpose, giving them an additional layer of protection against potential attacks.

Phoronix reported that Intel appears to have suspended its bounty program that once paid up to $100,000 per bug. Intel’s replacement for the Intigriti program offers no rewards, and no reason was given for the change. The Intigriti site states that it “is a responsible disclosure program without bounties,” confirming the report. A check of the site shows that the bounty board is still up but lists the program as suspended.

Intel’s site still lists details on the bug bounty program with awards that range “from $500 up to $100,000, based on quality of the report” and other factors. This program launched, invite-only, in 2017, and became open to all researchers in 2018, covering software, hardware, firmware, and open-source projects. Almost half of the CVEs Intel addressed in 2020, 105 out of 231, arrived through the bounty program, Intel said.

The old bounty board split vulnerabilities into four tiers, which were priced accordingly: Tier 1 from $2,000 to $100,000, Tier 2 $1,000 to $30,000, Tier 3 $500 to $10,000, and Tier 4 $250 to $5,000. Intel expanded the program’s scope to include web services between mid-2025 and October 2025, but it said in a January 6 update on Intigriti that it was evaluating “enhanced bounty and bonus criteria.” In about eight months, the bounties went from evaluation to suspension.

The outlet speculated that with the Linux kernel and other open-source projects being “bombarded” with security reports, it would not be surprising if AI bug-seeking played a role. Linux kernel CVEs have approached 2,000 per release, a fourfold increase from about 500, with maintainers “completely overwhelmed.” Linus Torvalds, the creator of the Linux kernel, has said that duplicate AI reports on the kernel security list are “almost entirely unmanageable.” Curl, for one, closed its bounty program due to AI slop floods.

As a point of reference, HackerOne’s Internet Bug Bounty (IBB) program paused submissions effective March 27. “AI-assisted research is expanding vulnerability discovery across the ecosystem, increasing both coverage and speed,” HackerOne said on the program’s page. HackerOne is still paying queued submissions, with rewards from $68 to $2,257 based on severity. This supports the idea that AI has affected software programs, but it may not be as significant for hardware and firmware.

Intel’s next steps are worth watching to see if this suspension ends up permanent in a fast-changing landscape. Researchers are still able to submit vulnerabilities through the new program; it just offers no bounties for them. Checking AMD’s Intigriti page today shows that the program there is also suspended, although Intigriti does have an auto-suspend mechanism. This follows an earlier payment dispute over scope with a bounty hunter in June.

Even if AI tools carry a stigma and may be a factor in these recent events, they have proven handy. AI company OpenAI paid Hacktron researchers a $6,500 bounty for a discovered exploit chain using rival Anthropic’s model. Torvalds, who previously dismissed AI as mostly marketing, has also called AI “clearly a useful” tool, and acceptance in the field may grow.

A team of white-hat hackers from cybersecurity startup Hackron AI has successfully hacked OpenAI using Claude tools. In an X post on September 18, the team claimed they breached OpenAI's internal codebase on July 25 and gained access to the ChatGPT and Codex accounts of some OpenAI employees. They established proof of the hack via a pull request to OpenAI's private repository before reporting the vulnerabilities to OpenAI. The company reportedly fixed the issue within 14 hours of the report and paid the researchers a $6,500 bounty.

Operating as hackers under OpenAI’s bug bounty program, Hacktron researchers uncovered critical vulnerabilities that granted them access to internal employee tools and the ability to compromise private software repositories. The researchers exploited a single sign-on (SSO) misconfiguration and a Remote Code Execution (RCE) flaw in Discourse, a third-party platform that powers OpenAI’s community discussion forum. The chain of attack was as follows: HEIF upload → libheif heap overflow → RCE → OpenAI SSO flaw → ChatGPT/Codex takeover → connected GitHub → internal PR.

First, the researchers uploaded a malicious HEIF (High Efficiency Image File) image to the forum as a profile picture. When Discourse’s server-side software tried to process the image using an outdated libheif package, it triggered a heap overflow memory vulnerability, causing the library to crash and mismanage internal system memory. The researchers carefully orchestrated the memory crash to achieve remote code execution. After gaining access to the forum's local server environment, the researchers intercepted the server’s environmental configurations and session handling, discovering an SSO flaw in which the forum's authentication system did not adequately validate or isolate user sessions from other OpenAI services.

Armed with session tokens hijacked from the local forum server database, the hackers exploited the SSO flaw to impersonate a real OpenAI employee, allowing them to bypass traditional login screens and infiltrate a highly privileged internal account linked to OpenAI's development teams. As many tech companies unify authentication across corporate apps, the hijacked employee account was directly linked to OpenAI’s corporate enterprise systems, including GitHub, Slack, and email accounts. The researchers were able to access OpenAI’s massive private codebase, where they initiated an internal Pull Request as definitive proof of the exploit.

Similar to an incident last month in which China-linked hackers used AI to carry out the first-ever end-to-end autonomous cyberattack on Taiwan's government, the Hacktron hack also used artificial intelligence. The researchers constructed the exploit pipeline using Anthropic's Claude Opus 5 model, after attempts with Opus 4.8 failed. After they found the unpatched libheif library on OpenAI's forum, they fed the raw server data into the model, asking it to write an exploit for the bug.

The model analyzed the memory structure and successfully calculated how to trigger the heap buffer overflow. It generated the precise, weaponized code required to create the malicious HEIF image. The human hackers uploaded it to the forum — triggering the Remote Code Execution — then manually executed the rest of the “attack.” An important clarification is that they used an authorized, cybersecurity-configured version of Claude, which relaxes certain cyber restrictions for authorized researchers.

After gaining access, the researchers say they immediately halted testing and reported the vulnerabilities to OpenAI and Discourse — both of which have fixed their sides of the issue — without studying or downloading OpenAI's source code. From the initial finding to full resolution took 72 hours, after which OpenAI rewarded the researchers with a $6,500 bounty. The incident further highlights ongoing concerns over the risk of AI-powered cyberattacks. Recently, rogue OpenAI agents autonomously breached HuggingFace. US frontier AI companies are now warning against sophisticated distillation attacks.

Flock says that its cameras are protected by on-device encryption, and even though a security researcher noted some flaws in its system, the company said that physical access is still required to exploit them and that the images are only briefly retained on the device before they’re forwarded to the cloud. However, 404 Media says that a hacking group called stegan0gram found out that this wasn’t the case after they took down a Flock camera positioned over a roadway and analyzed the data stored inside it.

While the hacking group failed to access the most sensitive data stored on the Flock camera, they were still able to access its Android operating system and found two storage partitions, labeled “vendor” and “media.” The latter was found to contain an encryption key that unlocked another partition containing all the media files from the camera. 404 Media said that that particular Flock camera captured about 1.6 million images across 21 days, detecting around 50,200 vehicles and, more concerningly, 11 people. There were also 27,321 video clips saved on the device — MP4 files with a 1024 x 768 resolution that lasted about a second or two.

Abilities like reading license plates and describing vehicle characteristics like color, make, and model are done on Flock’s servers, but these cameras still retain some edge AI capabilities. This includes detecting people, vehicles, bicycles, and plate-like shapes, which it then crops and sends to the company servers, alongside the original images. Although the software was found to have some facial detection capabilities, the publication said that this was the stock capabilities included in the operating system and wasn’t used by the camera.

This discovery by the hacking group raises another issue with Flock’s system, which is facing a lot of controversies when it comes to privacy and misuse. For example, several police officers have been arrested for using it to stalk romantic partners, while another incident over a mistyped license plate resulted in the unnecessary “ambush” of a car reviewer. Because of this, some towns and cities have ended their contracts with the company, while other people are taking things into their own hands to blind the controversial cameras.

Nevertheless, some critics say that those who are against the deployment of these systems should refrain from damaging or sabotaging these devices, as doing so will only make the authorities feel that these systems are needed. “I think that type of vigilantism will only crystallize the police and the state at large in their belief that this tool is necessary,” former Pawtucket, Rhode Island, police officer Noel Pichardo told the news website. “The longer the state continues to ignore the groanings of their constituents who are against this type of surveillance, the more this will happen.”

Anyone keeping track of world news in the early 2010s, and reports on tech in particular, has probably heard about Stuxnet. That malware spawned a large number of conspiracy theories — with the kicker that some of them were actually true. The malware targeted Iranian nuclear facilities and is believed to be the first digital worm to cause direct physical damage in meatspace. An unknown security researcher has now published a source code reverse-engineering of Stuxnet in all its glory.

The worm's ultimate target, allegedly a successful one, were industrial controllers from Siemens that were reportedly used in Iranian's Natanz nuclear enrichment plant. Once it reached the target, Stuxnet's payload manipulated the frequency converters in industrial centrifuges, in a bid to subtly damage the rotors — all while keeping the plant staff in the dark by reporting normal operation.

The repository contains build instructions so interested techies can try it out for themselves and learn all about its inner workings. You'll need a Windows XP or Windows 7 virtual machine, and for obvious reasons, you shouldn't configure any network connectivity for it. To witness the full effects of the payload rather than just the spreading mechanisms, you'll need the appropriate Siemens software, and ideally hardware — though we figure that industrial-scale centrifuges aren't exactly common in techies' cable drawers.

In its heyday, Stuxnet spread via three mechanisms. The primary infection vector was USB sticks with Windows shortcuts and autorun.inf files. Upon plugging one of those sticks in, just viewing the drive's contents would immediately trigger infection thanks to a zero-day vulnerability.

Infected systems then autonomously tried to spread the worm further via the network using a zero-day Windows Print Spooler vulnerability that would let an attacker write system files into any machine sharing a printer. It would also copy itself into accessible network shares. To evade Windows driver signature checks, Stuxnet used two digital certificates stolen from Realtek and JMicron.

The worm also had code to inject itself into Siemens software, by way of the WinCC SQL Server database, and embedding its code in Step 7 project files that automatically ran when engineers opened them. Since those files were almost guaranteed to be shared among more than one engineer, it made for an excellent internal infection vector that didn't depend on having network share control.

The final step was taking charge of the DLL that communicated with the actual centrifuges and injecting malicious code into the PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers) of those machines to stealthily mess with the rotors.

Stuxnet was part of Operation Olympic Games, an alleged coordinated effort between the U.S. and Israel to try and curb Iran's purported progress in creating nuclear weapons at its Natanz facility. The initiative seemingly ran under both the Bush and Obama administrations, and was supposedly a way to dissuade Israel from launching its own preemptive strike against Iran. The software was allegedly developed by both the Pentagon and Israel's Unit 8200, and was reportedly successful in bringing down about 10% of Natanz' centrifuges by ultimately seriously damaging their rotors.

However, the worm had a nasty bug: it didn't have sufficient checks about which environment it was in, and failed to notice it was no longer in a local network environment. When engineers took their laptops home, it escaped out to the internet at large, at which point security researchers worldwide let out a collective "huh, that's odd" and proceeded to investigate. Mercifully, the worm contained a hard-coded self-destruct date set for June 24, 2012.

A federal grand jury in California has indicted Russian citizen Searzhudin Tamirlanovich Aktulaev for allegedly conducting phishing attacks that stole data from over 80,000 computers between June 2016 and November 2017, using TVRAT and DarkVNC remote-control malware. Detailed in a Department of Justice press release on September 1st, the indictment — filed in June 2021 and released September 2026 — lists charges of “Conspiracy, Transmission of a Program, Information, Code, and Command to Cause Damage to a Protected Computer, and Aggravated Identity Theft, among other offenses.”

Aktulaev was extradited to the U.S. in August 2026, five years after his arrest in Cyprus in May 2021. He made his first appearance in federal court in San Francisco — after which he was remanded to federal custody — and is scheduled to appear in district court on October 5, 2026. The arrest was made after an FBI investigation, and the case is being prosecuted by the National Security, Cyber, and Special Prosecutions Section.

According to the indictment, Aktulaev “conspired to exploit the online message platform of a well-known freelance employment technology company, located in the Northern District of California, to spread malware to approximately 80,000 freelancers”. He sent messages containing malicious Microsoft Excel attachments, using approximately 255 fake user accounts. Once opened, the attachments prompted users to run a macro that then downloaded malware from the Internet, mirroring a hack earlier this year in which an unofficial 7-zip.com website served malware-laden downloads for over a week.

The attack used TVRAT (TeamViewer Remote Access Trojan) and DarkVNC malware, both of which grant the attacker remote control of the infected system. TVRAT exploits TeamViewer, while DarkVNC exploits VNC Viewer, popular remote administration tools. The malware stole and uploaded data from the victims' computers to a command-and-control server, from which Aktulaev and his co-conspirators extracted the stolen data to “commit fraud and other criminal activities”.

The indictment says thousands of computers infected by the TVRAT malware were “calling back” to a command-and-control domain hosted in the United States, which was paid for using virtual currency. Roughly half of the victims were in the United States, many of whom were Northern District of California residents, according to the indictment.

“A database found on the command-and-control domain revealed thousands of victims. Additionally, a shared document on the email account used in the criminal activities contained information to include e-commerce login credentials, as well as personally identifiable information (“PII”) for hundreds of victims,” the press release said.

If convicted, Aktulaev could spend up to 20 years behind bars and pay a $250,000 fine or twice the total illicit gains for the conspiracy to commit wire fraud charge alone. The other charges carry terms ranging from two to twenty years in prison, in addition to fines. Meanwhile, the FBI is currently investigating another hack in which 153 million US and Canadian drivers’ licenses were leaked on a Russian cybercrime forum.

More than 153 million US and Canadian driver’s licenses, as well as other identity documents, have reportedly become available for purchase on the dark web for a limited time. According to cybersecurity journalist Brian Krebs, the service was called Nexus, and although it’s no longer available at the time of writing, it claimed to have possessed 153 million driver’s licenses, 10 million ID cards, 1.9 million travel documents, 1.3 million international driver’s licenses, 579k medical cards, 429k common access cards, 91k residence cards, 77k employment authorization records, and 5 million other documents, allegedly sourced from an ID-authentication service based in Louisiana.

The service was advertised on the Russian cybercrime forum Exploit, where whoever was promoting it posted the driver’s license of Krebs as a free sample, which caught the journalist’s attention. He was also able to see a preview of U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s information on the database — a concerning breach of security for someone with such a sensitive position in the government. After further investigation, they concluded that the service seemed to have possessed legitimate data, especially after searching for the data of several of his friends and family members with their consent. One thing that all the people he found in the database had in common was that they all used Hertz to rent a vehicle.

Krebs also talked with security and privacy researcher Zach Edwards, who said that their information was also found on Nexus. Edwards said that they did not rent a car recently but used their ID at a Planet13 marijuana dispensary. The time stamps found on the scanned images of the driver’s licenses and other identity documents coincide with the time that the victims used their IDs at the said companies, confirming that they were the sources of the leaks. However, Planet13 and Hertz do not do their own authentication; instead, they contract a service provider for the service. Now, it turns out that both Planet13 and Hertz used the company for identity verification and ID-authentication — IDScan.

Based on the evidence gathered by Krebs, it seems that the leak is centered around the company. He has already contacted the company about the issue, and they said they were investigating the matter. “At this point I’m not able to share any additional information, but the updates you have provided have been welcome, and helpful to our team’s investigation,” Jillian Kossman, a marketing and operations leader at idscan.net, told the journalist. The FBI has also started looking into the leak, with its New Orleans field office opening an official investigation into the breach.

The massive amount of data that was briefly available on the dark web is certainly concerning. A similar data breach hit Discord after its third-party service provider was hit and resulted in the exposure of 70,000 government IDs. Incidents like these have got privacy experts concerned with the push for online age verification requirements, which is why the EFF is asking the California governor to veto the law requiring this.

Aside from privacy-invasive checks and stepping on First Amendment rights, the leakage of sensitive data like this could increase incidents of stolen identity and more. Driver’s licenses are often widely accepted for opening credit lines and bank accounts, with both photographic, UV, and IR scans available on many of the leaked licenses. Aside from that, it could also potentially compromise the privacy and security of vulnerable people, like those fleeing domestic violence and those who are under the witness protection program.

A new local‑only password manager, notes app, and secure vault that hides your secrets in an ordinary-looking .PNG image file is now available. BlindLock does all this and more with an option to bind to your hardware using TPM2.0, Secure Enclave, or StrongBox. No cloud storage or central vault account is required, and the dev is selling lifetime licenses at $49 (for now). There is an interactive online demo, with nothing uploaded or downloaded, as well as a downloadable full 7-day demo available.

BlindLock’s solo developer David Domingo indicates that one of the main drivers behind his efforts to create this application was the theft of customer vault backups from LastPass in late 2022. What happened to LastPass could have also happened to 1Password, Dashlane, even Proton Pass, reckons Domingo. “When your vault sits on someone else's server, you inherit every risk that server carries: employee access, infrastructure vulnerabilities, government subpoenas, supply chain attacks, and the simple mathematical reality that a server holding tens of millions of vaults is a far more attractive target than your laptop,” says the BlindLock dev on his blog.

So, three independent layers of security apply to your BlindLock vault. It is invisible in its ordinary-looking PNG carrier, not just encrypted. BlindLock doesn’t run a central vault database, so there is nothing for attackers to steal from BlindLock servers and crack later. Your resting vault file uses 256-bit authenticated encryption and already includes NIST post-quantum components. It is also bound to your device. “The vault opens only when three things match: the carrier file, your master password and your authorized device,” asserts the BlindLock app page. “A copied file alone is not enough to gain access.”

BlindLock’s feature set is pretty broad for a new offering. Fully encrypted inside your chosen .PNG holiday snap or cat photo is a password manager, Markdown-supporting secure notes, a built-in 2FA authenticator, and an encrypted file vault (for any type of file), and there is support for an optional fourth-factor security key like a YubiKey or Google Titan, etc.

Accessing your BlindLock data requires three things at once: the carrier file, your master password, and the authorized device - the vault key is sealed to that device's security chip, which is TPM 2.0, Secure Enclave, or StrongBox depending on the platform. You can avoid overly bloating your central .PNG file by squirreling larger files separately in their own encrypted containers. BlindLock employs a hidden volumes system not unlike VeraCrypt for these containers. Domingo admits these are “not magically unfindable,” but are Argon2id-hardened, 256-bit authentication-encrypted and stored inconspicuously. For device loss or migration, users must create an encrypted BlindLock backup and keep its recovery phrase separately.

As per the intro, BlindLock is being introduced as a one-time $49 purchase. This perpetual pricing plan only applies to the first 1,000 licenses. There will be three waves: “the first 100 at $49, the next 350 at $89, and the final 550 at $109. After that, BlindLock is subscription-only,” says Domingo. The independent dev wants to lay a solid financial foundation, so development of BlindLock can continue.

This article is merely sharing the news about BlindLock and shouldn't be taken as a recommendation. Please check out the online and downloadable demos and judge whether it works for you and offers the features you want for the price.

Security researchers have found three different backdoor-like implants hidden in firmware for routers manufactured by Shenzhen Zhibotong Electronics, better known as ZBT. The hardware is sold around the world under a bewildering array of brands, meaning you may not even realize you're using a ZBT router. The research, published by security firm VulnCheck, began with a Zbtlink AX3000 router. Researchers found that its firmware contained an implant that they dubbed ENDLESSDOORS, as it automatically phones home to a command-and-control server and can execute arbitrary commands as root.

ENDLESSDOORS is essentially a remote-control system embedded directly into the router's firmware. It starts automatically at boot and disguises itself as a normal Linux kernel process called kworker. The router periodically connects to a hard-coded server and announces itself. There's no meaningful authentication or encryption involved. Commands received from the server are passed directly to a shell running as root, and the implant can also establish an interactive root shell.

VulnCheck demonstrated the problem by impersonating the command server and taking control of its own test router. In other words, this isn't merely a theoretical vulnerability; if an attacker can hijack the connection to the implant's command server, they can obtain complete control of the router. The researchers found ENDLESSDOORS embedded in firmware for 20 ZBT models, including the Z8102AX, WG3526, WE826-T3-DSIM, and several other cellular routers. The same hardware is also sold under other names because ZBT manufactures routers for OEM and ODM customers. VulnCheck assigned the issue CVE-2026-66747, with a CVSS score of 9.3, but that wasn't the end of the investigation.

VulnCheck subsequently bought an $88 Deep Orange cellular router from a US seller on Amazon and discovered that it was actually a white-labeled ZBT-WE826-T2. Its 2019 firmware was too old to contain ENDLESSDOORS, but instead, it contained two other implants that the firm designated DARKLANTERN and SPEAKINGSTONE.

DARKLANTERN is the particularly straightforward one. Operating as the infosrvd service, it opens a listener on the WAN via UDP port 9992 and accepts commands directly from the Internet without authentication. An attacker only needs to send a fixed 19-byte info probe to force the router to reveal identifying information like its model, firmware version, MAC address, and uptime.

Researchers found that the backdoor's meager security mechanisms could be trivially bypassed: its command payload checksum relies on a static, hardcoded salt ("mqonu.com"), and its internal MAC address filter can be entirely circumvented simply by submitting a MAC field of all zeroes. This allows any remote attacker to easily forge a packet and execute arbitrary commands as root. VulnCheck scanned the Internet and found 203 exposed DARKLANTERN instances in 22 countries, spread across 16 router models.

Meanwhile, SPEAKINGSTONE works differently and is even more concerning. Rather than waiting for an attacker to connect to a listening port, it runs as the yunmgrd service and periodically beacons outbound to ZBT's command-and-control infrastructure over UDP port 10000. That makes it useful even when the router sits securely behind NAT or a firewall, as it relies on a custom format dubbed "zbtProtocol" to push full device fingerprints directly to the remote server. SPEAKINGSTONE is also considerably more capable than simply providing a remote shell. According to VulnCheck, its command protocol allows remote operators to execute arbitrary commands, steal WAN PPPoE credentials, rewrite a DNS hijack list, and establish a reverse SSH tunnel.

The researchers also discovered a backup command server domain embedded in the malware that nobody had registered, so naturally, they registered it themselves. VulnCheck set up a server capable of speaking SPEAKINGSTONE's protocol at the newly registered "www.findmyipaddr.com" and watched the infected routers start calling home.

By August 21st, 392 unique devices had connected to the sinkhole. Fully 390 of those 392 were located in China, with the vast majority using China Mobile's network. Most of those devices were the same router model running the same firmware, suggesting a large-scale carrier deployment rather than random consumer infections. VulnCheck describes this particular deployment as "domestic Chinese surveillance technology."

Now, that doesn't mean every ZBT router is a Chinese surveillance device. VulnCheck found ZBT hardware being sold under numerous independent brands worldwide, including Lippert Components, Wave WiFi, OneX in Australia, MoFI Network in Canada, Digineo in Germany, and more. Vulncheck explicitly notes that some of the firmware they examined did not contain the implants, calling out MOFI Network in particular for creating its own firmware which, when examined, "didn't contain any implants."

The problem is that ZBT's OEM business makes the hardware's origin surprisingly difficult to identify. The same underlying platforms have appeared under brands including WiFlyer, Deep Orange, Cioswi, CroSkylink and KuWFi, among others.

So the really unsettling part isn't that VulnCheck found three vulnerabilities in an obscure router. It's that these aren't conventional vulnerabilities where someone accidentally forgot to bounds-check a buffer. These are pieces of software deliberately included in the router firmware that provide remote access to the device. We would normally call this malware, but ZBT has described ENDLESSDOORS as an after-sales technical-support mechanism.

VulnCheck's counterargument is pretty compelling; the firm says that whatever its intended purpose, the mechanisms don't securely authenticate the party controlling them. An attacker who can hijack the communications can potentially exercise the same privileges, and because ZBT hardware is frequently sold under other brands, simply not buying something with “ZBT” printed on the box isn't necessarily enough.

If you own one of the affected devices, of which you can find a list at VulnCheck's blog entries for the vulnerabilities (ENDLESSDOORS and the other two), the only real solution is to simply replace it, because the security holes were installed at the factory; it's not as if installing a different firmware version is going to restore trust. Even if your device isn't listed, for anyone running a cheap cellular router, travel router, RV router, or other piece of networking hardware from an obscure OEM, you need to keep in mind that the brand on the plastic probably isn't the company that wrote the firmware, and the fellow who wrote the firmware may not share your values with regard to freedom or privacy.

The U.S. Department of Justice and FBI revealed in a statement Wednesday that it had seized domains related to platforms that it claims were operated by China state-sponsored hackers. The press release says the Federal Reserve, Department of Energy, Department of Justice, Department of Health and Human Services, NIH, NASA, and U.S. Senate all experienced "computer intrusion activity."

The Justice Department says a state-sponsored group known as QTFY is responsible for the intrusion, which the U.S. government claims came to be through two pieces of malware: QTRouter and QScan. The release says the People's Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of State Security was among QTFY's paying customers.

According to the U.S. government, QScan "scans and automatically infects thousands of [IoT] devices worldwide." Those devices are then added to the QTRouter network. It's a botnet, but the Justice Department also calls it an "obfuscation layer" to mask the origin of malicious traffic. QTFY's system has been used to compromise U.S. critical infrastructure since 2018, according to the affidavit.

The group is said to be employed by the Nanjing Xinjiuwei Network Technology Company, which we were unable to find any information on.

As part of the action, the Justice Department seized three domains: qtproxy.xyz, qt-proxy.org, and qt-team.com. Those domains now show the seizure notice you can see below.

The investigation into the group began as early as 2019, when the FBI looked into a system intrusion at NASA related to the CVE-2019-11510, which was subsequently patched. The FBI traced the activity back to two Gmail accounts and a phone number with a +86 country code (the code for the PRC).

The group allegedly rented infrastructure from commercial platforms, leading to a series of abuse complaints to the emails by hosting provider Hostwinds. The FBI says the group obtained the three domains it seized between 2022 and 2024, registering them with domain registrar Namecheap and paying through PayPal.

Although the PRC routinely denies hacking activities in the U.S., Chinese officials reportedly acknowledged that the government was behind a series of attacks on U.S. infrastructure late last year. In 2024, 30-year-old wiretap systems deployed by the U.S. government in telecom and internet providers were reportedly compromised by Chinese attackers.

Chinese multinational tech giant Alibaba has been accused of tracking web users after a developer discovered its global online marketplace running hidden audio processes that could be used for sophisticated audio fingerprinting. While investigating an issue with his wireless headphones, Matt Callaghan found that opening an AliExpress webpage in Firefox or Chrome interfered with the multipoint Bluetooth audio feature.

As Callaghan explains in his blog post, “Normally the PC takes priority playing audio, with my phone being able to play audio when nothing is playing on the PC. Usually I listen to music on my phone but with notifications or YouTube playing through the PC.” However, shortly after loading the AliExpress homepage, audio from his phone would stop playing, despite no media playing on his PC. Closing the AliExpress tab immediately fixed the issue, while muting the tab, browser, or Windows did not seem to resolve it.

Their investigation began by inspecting various conventional media elements; however, he did not find any unusual activity. He also zeroed in on the fact that the problem would not begin immediately, but rather after the webpage had been sitting idle for a few seconds. He then moved on to inspect the Web Audio API to wrap the AudioContext constructor so that it would record whenever a page created an audio-processing context. They additionally wrapped AudioNode.prototype.connect() to see whether anything was connected to the context's audio destination.

Eventually, Callaghan found that the page was loading two suspicious scripts named collina.js and fireyejs.js, which appeared to be part of Alibaba's browser security and anti-abuse tooling. With some help from AI during his research, he found that the scripts built a Web Audio graph using a sawtooth oscillator to generate a waveform. An analyzer then measured the results after they passed through the browser's audio implementation, while another script read the resulting frequency data. The scripts also set the volume gain to zero, meaning there was no audible sound or noise, even though the browser continued actively processing the Web Audio graph.

Unlike autoplaying videos, there is no media element playing, which is why the browser's tab mute control does not help. However, the webpage continues performing live audio processing, keeping the Bluetooth audio path active and preventing multipoint Bluetooth headphones from switching between devices. Further investigation also uncovered code collecting information related to screen dimensions, device memory, browser plugins, WebGL rendering, supported audio and video formats, browser performance, mouse events, and more. The scripts also appear to serialize and encrypt the collected data before sending it to Alibaba's telemetry services using fetch() or sendBeacon() functions.

Following the discovery, Firefox said on X that its browser includes built-in protections against fingerprinting. The company pointed to a blog post explaining that Firefox 118, released in September 2023, introduced additional protections against Web Audio-based fingerprinting. Brave also claims to block audio fingerprinting by default. According to the browser maker, it does this by injecting randomized data into the browser's audio output, making the fingerprint appear different to websites and resetting the data between sessions.

Various U.S. agencies just released a warning claiming that Iranian hackers are targeting Siemens S7-series programmable logic controllers (PLCs). According to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) advisory, hackers are using publicly available information on these widely used devices to develop exploits that would enable remote access and control. They’re also using AI tools, allowing them to identify additional attack vectors and possibly adapt to any defensive measures operators may have taken to protect their systems.

“The actors leverage Internet scanning services to find Internet-exposed PLCs running outdated software or that are otherwise poorly protected,” the agency said in its warning. “The U.S. critical infrastructure sectors most targeted by this threat activity include Critical Manufacturing, Energy, Water and Wastewater, Chemical, Food and Agriculture, and Commercial Facilities. This is not a theoretical risk — it is an active threat. Depending on the specific circumstances, exploitation of poorly protected PLCs could lead to disruption of critical industrial processes, safety incidents, downtime or equipment damage, compromise of sensitive data, compliance violations, and cascading impacts across interconnected systems.”

The warning comes from multiple government agencies, not just CISA. The advisory was also co-authored by the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), underscoring how serious this issue could become. Because of this, operators using Siemens S7 PLCs (and other PLCs operating critical infrastructure) are advised to keep their equipment updated with the latest applicable security patches, isolate it from the internet as much as possible, protect it with strong access controls, and deploy cybersecurity measures to monitor industrial control systems (ICS) for any anomalies and possible malicious activity.

What makes the threat especially dangerous is that the use of AI tools could enable potential attackers to make malicious files look and behave like legitimate monitoring tools. They achieve this by using open-source industrial automation libraries, making it easier for unsuspecting users to fall victim to their attacks. Although the agencies did not specify where these attacks could originate, they came less than a month after the water infrastructure of several states was hit by cyberattacks thought to have originated from Iran.

The proliferation of internet-connected devices in critical infrastructure has made them prime targets for both hackers seeking to make big money and nation-states seeking to gain an advantage over their opponents. This was made apparent in recent years when key government websites and online services in Ukraine went down just as the Russian military started pouring across its borders back in 2022. More recently, a worm from an unknown source wiped Iranian machines during the first quarter of 2026, which happened around the same time as the United States’ bombing campaign against the country.

There were even claims from Iran that networking devices from American and European companies failed during an attack even though they were disconnected from the rest of the world. Aside from these scenarios in active warfare, cyberattacks could also be used in gray warfare, where opponents can inflict maximum damage while retaining plausible deniability, reducing the chances of retaliation.

Slovakia sought to modernize its traffic control systems with the acquisition of a batch of 279 new NERO R-ONE speed cameras, reports the Risky Bulletin Newsletter. Unfortunately, the country’s national security service, the NBU, has discovered that the cameras have multiple security issues. Firstly, they have SMS-activated Russian backdoors. Secondly, live camera feeds can be accessed by anyone with the device IP, no password necessary. Slovakia splurged a chunk of its €30 million EU-fund modernization budget on this now deactivated system.

The nearly 300 freshly installed NERO R-ONE cameras are thought to be rebranded Russian CORDON PRO.M traffic cameras, produced by a St. Petersburg-based firm called Semicon. Their path to acquisition sounds rather serpentine, with the big batch reportedly bought via a Cyprus-based shell company with fake certifications. Reports also suggest that pressure from the opposition political party in Slovakia led to the NBU investigations. The current government of the country, led by populist Robert Fico, initially denied reports that the cameras were of Russian origin and rebuffed any security concerns. Fico has what some would describe as a pro-Russia tilt, but you can read more about that elsewhere, if you are interested.

Camera flaws and vulnerabilities

As we mentioned in the intro, the hundreds of cameras Slovakia recently acquired and deployed have multiple issues which seem serious. Probably most seriously, in terms of national security, these cameras contain a hardcoded list of Russian phone numbers, which can be used to open a backdoor. An SMS from one of these numbers can open shell and network access.

Another problem with the cameras concerns broader security flaws. For example the SecureBoot feature is ineffective, and the web management portal can be accessed, exposing live streams, by anyone with the camera IP.

Cameras that have been installed and set up have since been deactivated by the Slovak Ministry of the Interior. Meanwhile, for due diligence, an independent auditor will be called in to confirm the NBU’s findings. It is thought that Croatia, and some other countries in Eastern Europe, may have undiscovered issues with traffic control cameras of similar origin.

For the most part, you can rest assured that your device will remain uncompromised by malware if you keep to verified, trusted sources for downloading software. And yet, software booby traps sometimes find their way onto legitimate wares, as was the case of Geekom's network drivers for its range of A7, A8, AE7, AE8, AX7 Pro and AX8 Pro mini-PCs, as discovered by Videocardz.

If you have a Geekom mini-PC from those lines and have installed the LAN driver from the firm's website in the past, we'd advise a full system wipe if possible, or at the very least a Windows Defender offline scan. But in the words of Lt. Ellen Ripley, "nuke the entire site from orbit. It's the only way to be sure."

As it's part of a driver installer, this malicious software would get administrator-level permissions on your machine, being granted permission to steal all your data, intercept your keystrokes, or retrieve passwords. It connects to command-and-control centers so that the malfeasants can remotely access your PC at any time.

The basic story is fairly simple and sad as these things go: a support page for those series of machines contained a LAN driver whose installer was laced with the Asruex backdoor malware. As expected, Geekom has removed the software package in question and offered an apology, stating the driver was on a "legacy page [that] had already been replaced and was no longer accessible through the normal Support navigation, although it remained indexed by search engines."

The latter bit is precisely the problem, as it's a reasonable bet that many users (like yours truly) will first use Google or AI search to find the driver, and wouldn't go through Geekom's support menus. Furthermore, Geekom requested that Videocardz retract its original reporting of the problem, an arguably questionable move, and an ask that Videocardz denied.

For its part, Videocardz checked that the Asruex malware was indeed present with four separate detection engines: VirusTotal, FileScan.IO, MetaDefender, and Yarafy. It's worth nothing that nothing suggests that these families of mini-PCs are vulnerable out-of-the-box, too. That was unfortunately the case with some AceMagic machines a couple years ago that shipped with Bladabindi and Redline malware from the factory, as was Asus' incident with poisoned software updates in 2019.

The common knowledge for a new install is to get driver packages from Windows Update and only go to the manufacturers' website if something is amiss. However, many users might go to Geekom's site to ensure that they have the latest versions of their drivers, or perhaps they downloaded the LAN driver when trying to diagnose network issues of some sort.

As for a baseline cause, in our view this is clearly a case of Hanlon's Razor, as relatively small OEMs would have next to nothing to gain and everything to lose by intentionally shipping malware packages with their machines. As can be attested by most anyone who's installed Windows motherboard software of variable quality, Taiwan has historically been regarded as considering software a secondary concern when developing technology products, in part thanks to its unique geopolitical situation and the fact that its government only splits 30% of its IT budget to software.

The Dutch National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NL) reported on August 12 that attackers are actively exploiting CVE-2026-65400, an authentication bypass in macOS Screen Sharing, to compromise Macs with port 5900 exposed to the Internet. In every case reported to the agency, attackers obtained root access and installed a Monero cryptocurrency miner. Apple patched the flaw on August 6 in an out-of-band update covering macOS Tahoe 26.6.1, Sequoia 15.7.9, and Sonoma 14.8.9, but the bug's official severity has since been rewritten, with CISA raising its CVSS score from 7.1 to 9.8 critical on August 14, now assessing the attack as automatable.

NCSC-NL first flagged the vulnerability in an advisory on August 7, a day after Apple's patch, urging organizations to update immediately. The August 12 revision added that public proof-of-concept code is now available and that active abuse had been observed on multiple internet-exposed systems.

Technical details of the bug were presented at last week's Black Hat conference, according to Ars Technica, alongside a video of the exploit in action. The root-level access attackers gained in the reported incidents matches the level of control researchers demonstrated in May, when they bypassed Memory Integrity Enforcement on Apple's M5 silicon with AI assistance.

NVD's change log for CVE-2026-65400 shows CISA initially scored the bug at 7.1 on August 6, using a vector that assumed an attacker needed low-level privileges and could achieve only partial impact. On August 14, the agency replaced that vector with one requiring no privileges and granting full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, raising the score to 9.8. A day later, CISA's decision record for the flaw flipped from "not automatable" to automatable, an assessment consistent with unattended Macs being rooted at scale for coin mining.

The flaw still isn't in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog as of this writing. The same decision record also still lists exploitation as "none," despite the NCSC-NL report. Users who can't update immediately can turn Screen Sharing off under System Settings > General > Sharing.

Apple's advisory says an attacker on the network may be able to "authenticate to Screen Sharing without valid credentials," and describes the fix as improved state management during authentication. Screen Sharing is the VNC-based remote desktop service built into macOS, listening on TCP port 5900, which is disabled by default. The August 6 update comes just 10 days after Apple’s July 27 security round and fixes only this single CVE, representing the second Screen Sharing patch in a month. CVE-2026-43760, which required valid credentials to exploit, was fixed in the late-July releases.

President Donald Trump signed a presidential memorandum on August 12 establishing the first U.S. program that lets vetted private companies conduct offensive cyber operations, including attacks that destroy data and systems, against foreign cybercrime organizations. Participating firms must post at least $1 million in escrow, forfeited if they break the program's rules, and every operation requires written approval from officials of the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security. Just a few months ago, the administration publicly ruled out this very policy.

In March, Thomas Lind, then a senior adviser at the Office of the National Cyber Director, told a conference the administration had no plans to authorize private offensive operations. "We're not interested in fighting pirates with pirates," Lind said. National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross said the same week that companies running offensive campaigns weren't what the administration meant when it asked industry for more help.

The memorandum authorizes two categories of activity: "Cyber Surveillance Operations," meaning unauthorized access to foreign systems to collect intelligence while staying undetected, and "Cyber Effects Operations," meaning the disruption or destruction of systems and the data on them. A National Coordination Center manages the program, implementation guidance is due within 60 days, and eligibility rules will admit both large firms and smaller companies suited to specialized tasks. Any company that unintentionally hits a U.S. person or a system on U.S. soil must halt operations and notify the government immediately.

A foreign group qualifies as a target under the memo unless "clear intelligence exists" establishing it's institutionally part of a foreign government or wholly operated under one's direction. Ransomware crews that operate with state tolerance but not formal state control, a description that fits much of the Russia-based ransomware ecosystem, stay well within the target scope. The DOJ and DHS directors can't approve operations likely to cause loss of life or rise to an armed attack under international law.

The memo stops short of prohibiting such operations, with approval authority for them sitting in a classified annex. Participating companies can also sign commercial deals with other private firms, and with state and local agencies, to receive threat data and propose operations based on it.

Jake Williams, vice president of research and development at cybersecurity firm Hunter Strategy, told TechCrunch that Americans involved in the operations "could easily be classified as non-uniformed combatants while traveling overseas." The memo follows suspected Iranian cyberattacks on water suppliers in 45 U.S. municipalities and a CISA alert on Iranian hackers targeting programmable logic controllers at water and energy companies, though state-directed hackers fall outside the program's own definition of a valid target.

Congress earmarked $1 billion for offensive cyber operations in last year's spending bill, and Google said in August last year it was preparing to take part in disruptive actions against cybercriminals.

Many cybersecurity exploits have been deemed The One Ring To Rule Them All, but that moniker is rarely as true as a literal bit that disables the memory mapping on some AMD CPUs, granting access to normally inaccessible areas. With just one instruction, you can access off-limits software like Platform Security Processor (PSP) where the TPM runs, the System Management Mode (SMM), microcode patch RAM, and other various sundries — in other words, full hardware-level control.

The exploit is called Skitter Creek Bath Salts (Skitter), and was developed by prolific hacker Christopher Domas, famous for finding CPU flaws like Sandsifter and God Mode Unlocked. Only AMD chips from the 15h and 16h families are affected, roughly 2011 to 2015 vintages. Family 15 is FX-series desktop chips and some Opterons, while 16h includes low-power Jaguar- and Puma-based SoCs like those in the PlayStation 4 and Xbox One, plus a handful of Athlon, Sempron, and Opteron-X chips, among others.

To pull off this exploit, you'll need kernel-level access, meaning the ability to run your own drivers. But once you do, the entirety of DRAM is your oyster. AMD published a security bulletin on the matter, saying these chips are out of security support, plus, as mentioned, the necessary access level means an attacker already controls the machine anyway.

If you're confused as to how one instruction opens up a system, here's our attempt at a simplification. Say you have 16 GB of RAM. You'd think that Windows gets all 16 GB to play with, from address 0 to the end of memory — but as you may have noticed before, it's actually a bit less than that. The rest is reserved for system-level data.

Some parts are visible to the OS so it can interact with devices, but others include Very Important Things like PSP, SMM, microcode patches, all in sections supposed to be completely untouchable. If they were accessible, the system as a whole wasn't secure by definition anymore — just think of a malicious driver being able to freely mess with how your processor handles data.

For performance reasons, modern processors' RAM controllers don't use memory in a straight line, so to speak — they use bank interleaving, meaning that the actual bytes in the DRAM are jumbled, all while the OS sees a nice, tidy, flat surface. As it turns out, the CPU setting that controls this feature is accessible to the OS in the aforementioned chip families, and it's called BankSwizzleMode (Swizzle). It can be toggled on or off with the instruction "xor dword [0xf80c2094], 0x00400000", a simple bit twiddle. And as it turns out, this can be exploited.

First, you run a loop to figure out how the mapping normally functions. You place a canary value in memory (say, 0xDEADBEEF, according to tradition), disable Swizzle, run through memory to see where it landed, and reenable Swizzle again. Do this enough times, and you know exactly how visible memory is mapped into physical DRAM, and vice versa.

With the map now in your possession, you can now disable Swizzle and force a read or write to normally inaccessible areas of the DRAM, since you now know where it will land. With this, you can access all the previously hidden code and data, netting you hardware-level access to do anything you want, including reading fTPM signing code and any other low-level shenanigans you can think of.

Attentive readers might be wondering why the system doesn't crash during this process since you're effectively temporarily turning the RAM into a spaghetti mess. The answer is that every time you enable and disable Swizzle, you prepare the CPU by disabling interrupts, along with a number of other measures. Even still, the machine can crash during the map-collection step, but that only needs to be done once. After you have the map, the likelihood of a crash is fairly low since you'll be targeting specific locations.

Another question might be why sending a bit to a memory location somehow messes with the CPU, and the answer is that part of OS-accessible memory is actually mapped to hardware according to the Memory-Mapped Configuration Space standard (MMCONFIG) — meaning that reads or writes to that space are directed to hardware configuration settings, not actual RAM.

Edit 8/14/2026: Clarified TPM.

Prolific hacker and Microsoft nemesis 'Nightmare Eclipse' has just published ShieldBreak, yet another Windows zero-day vulnerability that ought to get you SYSTEM-level privileges just by running some code as a regular user. Although Eclipse has generally kept ahead of Microsoft, it seems the company may be catching up, as our own quick testing found this exploit is already detected by Defender and might even be patched as of last Tuesday.

As described by the author, ShieldBreak is essentially a continuation of the previously reported RoguePlanet vulnerability in Windows Defender's subsystems. Eclipse claims that Microsoft failed to properly patch RoguePlanet, and that ShieldBreak in theory bypasses the recently added protection.

The proof-of-concept code for the new exploit is supposed to bring up a super-elevated command prompt with SYSTEM privileges (higher than Administrator). The author claims the vulnerability is present in the "latest" versions of Windows 11, Windows Server 2025, and Windows 10, though the proof-of-concept is limited to the former two operating systems.

Although researchers like Kevin Beaumont and Will Dormann say they've successfully reproduced the exploit, our informal testing in a Windows 11 virtual machine didn't yield any results. Said VM was just updated yesterday with the latest Windows 11 patches and currently sits at version 10.0.26200.9168. Given that Microsoft just published a giga-patch last Tuesday, there's a solid chance it plugged whichever hole ShieldBreak was getting through.

The sample screenshot in the ShieldBreak repository shows the exploit working under version 10.0.26100.33296, lending some credence to this theory. A sample size of one does not research make, so we advise caution and remind everyone to run their own testing before assuming the bug has truly been fixed.

Microsoft appears to have already published a Defender detection for it. We found it when double-checking our results, with just a 20-minute window between both tests, as shown in the screenshot below.

Even if the issue is fixed, not every user updates their machines as soon as patches are available, and perhaps more importantly, corporations tend to hold back on patches until they know they don't bring in any new issues. That means that a good portion of the world's machines may still be vulnerable to ShieldBreak.

Little is known about Nightmare Eclipse, other than that they really don't like Microsoft and claim the company has ruined their lives. Some cybersecurity experts like Brian Krebs and Kevin Beaumont have offered up the theory that Eclipse is a disgruntled Microsoft ex-employee.