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Synthese Library (304 book series)
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Books in this series (304 books)

"Logic", one of the central words in Western intellectual history, compre­ hends in its meaning such diverse things as the Aristotelian syllogistic, the scholastic art of disputation, the transcendental logic of the Kantian critique, the dialectical logic of Hegel, and the mathematical logic of the Principia Mathematica of Whitehead and Russell. The term "Formal Logic", following Kant is generally used to distinguish formal logical reasonings, precisely as formal, from the remaining universal truths based on reason. (Cf. SCHOLZ, 1931). A text-book example of a formal-logical inference which from "Some men are philosophers" and "All philosophers are wise" concludes that "Some men are wise" is called formal, because the validity of this inference depends only on the form ofthe given sentences -in particular it does not depend on the truth or falsity of these sentences. (On the dependence of logic on natural language, English, for example, compare Section 1 and 8). The form of a sentence like "Some men are philosophers", is that which remains preserved when the given predicates, here "men" and "philosophers" are replaced by arbitrary ones. The form itself can thus be represented by replacing the given predicates by variables. Variables are signs devoid of meaning, which may serve merely to indicate the place where meaningful constants (here the predicates) are to be inserted. As variables we shall use - as did Aristotle - letters, say P, Q and R, as variables for predicates.

Ex-library book. Hardcover is sound with lightly sun faded spine and lightly worn ends of spine and corners. Library plates and sticker on front endpapers. Library stamps on catalogue page and page block. Text-pages are clean and tight throughout. Includes indexes. No dust jacket. T

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The twenty-three papers collected in tbis volume represent an important part of my published work up to the date of this volume. I have not arranged the paper chronologically, but under four main headings. Part I contains five papers on methodology concerned with models and measurement in the sciences. This part also contains the first paper I published, 'A Set of Independent Axioms for Extensive Quantities', in Portugaliae Mathematica in 1951. Part 11 also is concerned with methodology and ineludes six papers on probability and utility. It is not always easy to separate papers on probability and utility from papers on measurement, because of the elose connection between the two subjects, but Artieles 6 and 8, even though they have elose relations to measurement, seem more properly to belong in Part 11, because they are concerned with substantive questions about probability and utility. The last two parts are concerned with the foundations of physics and the foundations of psychology. I have used the term foundations rather than philosophy, because the papers are mainly concerned with specific axiomatic formulations for particular parts of physics or of psychology, and it seems to me that the termfoundations more appropriately describes such constructive axiomatic ventures. Part 111 contains four papers on the foundations of physics. The first paper deals with foundations of special relativity and the last three with the role ofprobability in quantum mechanics.

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This book presents the classic relative consistency proofs in set theory that are obtained by the device of 'inner models'. Three examples of such models are investigated in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII; the most important of these, the class of constructible sets, leads to G6del's result that the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis are consistent with the rest of set theory [1]I. The text thus constitutes an introduction to the results of P. Cohen concerning the independence of these axioms [2], and to many other relative consistency proofs obtained later by Cohen's methods. Chapters I and II introduce the axioms of set theory, and develop such parts of the theory as are indispensable for every relative consistency proof; the method of recursive definition on the ordinals being an import­ ant case in point. Although, more or less deliberately, no proofs have been omitted, the development here will be found to require of the reader a certain facility in naive set theory and in the axiomatic method, such e as should be achieved, for example, in first year graduate work (2 cycle de mathernatiques).

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This collection of essays deals with three clusters of problems in the philo­ sophy of science: scientific method, conceptual models, and ontological underpinnings. The disjointedness of topics is more apparent than real, since the whole book is concerned with the scientific knowledge of fact. Now, the aim of factual knowledge is the conceptual grasping of being, and this understanding is provided by theories of whatever there may be. If the theories are testable and specific, such as a theory of a particular chemical reaction, then they are often called 'theoretical models' and clas­ sed as scientific. If the theories are extremely general, like a theory of syn­ thesis and dissociation without any reference to a particular kind of stuff, then they may be called 'metaphysical' - as well as 'scientific' if they are consonant with science. Between these two extremes there is a whole gamut of kinds of factual theories. Thus the entire spectrum should be dominated by the scientific method, quite irrespective of the subject matter. This is the leitmotiv of the present book. The introductory chapter, on method in the philosophy of science, tackles the question 'Why don't scientists listen to their philosophers?'.

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The idea that prompted the conferenee for which many of these papers were written, and that inspired this book, is stated in the Editorial Introduction reprinted below from Volume 21 of Synthese. The present volume contains the artieles in Synthese 21, Numbers 3-4 and Synthese 22, Numbers 1-2. In addition, it ineludes new papers by Saul Kripke, James McCawley, John R. Ross, and Paul Ziff, and reprints 'Grammar and Philosophy' by P. F. Strawson. Strawson's artiele first appeared in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, and is reprinted with the kind permission of the author and the Aristotelian Society. We also repeat our thanks to the Olivetti Companyand Edizione di Comunita of Milan for permission to inelude the paper by Dana Scott; it also appeared in Synthese 21. DONALO DAVIDSON GILBERT HARMAN EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION The success of linguistics in treating naturallanguages as formal syntactic systems has aroused the interest of a number of linguists in a paralleI or related development of semantics. For the most part quite independ- ently, many philosophers and logicians have reeently been applying formai semantic methods to structures increasingly like naturallanguages. While differenees in training, method and vocabulary tend to veil the fact, philosophers and linguists are converging, it seerns, on a common set of interrelated probiems. Sinee philosophers and linguists are working on the same, or very similar, probiems, it would obviously be instructive to compare notes.

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Of the four chapters in this book, the first two discuss (albeit in consider­ ably modified form) matters previously discussed in my papers 'On the Logic of Conditionals' [1] and 'Probability and the Logic of Conditionals' [2], while the last two present essentially new material. Chapter I is relatively informal and roughly parallels the first of the above papers in discussing the basic ideas of a probabilistic approach to the logic of the indicative conditional, according to which these constructions do not have truth values, but they do have probabilities (equal to conditional probabilities), and the appropriate criterion of soundness for inferences involving them is that it should not be possible for all premises of the inference to be probable while the conclusion is improbable. Applying this criterion is shown to have radically different consequences from the orthodox 'material conditional' theory, not only in application to the standard 'fallacies' of the material conditional, but to many forms (e. g. , Contraposition) which have hitherto been regarded as above suspi­ cion. Many more applications are considered in Chapter I, as well as certain related theoretical matters. The chief of these, which is the most important new topic treated in Chapter I (i. e.

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The leisure to do the thinking whose results are gathered here has largely been provided by the Academy of Finland, whose support has also made possible the help and co-operation of a group of younger logicians and philosophers. Less tangible support and help is unfortunately harder to record and to thank for. Once again, in working on the many themes I have tried to weave together in this book I have incurred more intellectual and moral debts I can in so many words acknowledge here. Let me only say that the closer to home I get the greater they become. I have especially in mind my colleagues and students at Stanford; my colleagues in Helsinki; the past and present members of my research group in Helsinki; and incom­ parably more than anybody else my wife Soili. Helsinki, April 1975 JAAKKO HINTIKKA INTRODUCTION A literal-minded reader might easily object to the (sub)title of this volume. What is to be found here, he might allege, are neither models, nor modalities stricto sensu, nor yet any completely new applications of modal logic. Even though the purpose of the title is only to signal the con­ tinuity between the present volume and its predecessor, Models for Modalities (D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, 1969), the objection is sufficiently well taken to serve as an excuse for an attempt to put my enterprise in a wider perspective.

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During the academic years 1972-1973 and 1973-1974, an intensive sem­ inar on the foundations of quantum mechanics met at Stanford on a regular basis. The extensive exploration of ideas in the seminar led to the org~ization of a double issue of Synthese concerned with the foundations of quantum mechanics, especially with the role of logic and probability in quantum meChanics. About half of the articles in the volume grew out of this seminar. The remaining articles have been so­ licited explicitly from individuals who are actively working in the foun­ dations of quantum mechanics. Seventeen of the twenty-one articles appeared in Volume 29 of Syn­ these. Four additional articles and a bibliography on -the history and philosophy of quantum mechanics have been added to the present volume. In particular, the articles by Bub, Demopoulos, and Lande, as well as the second article by Zanotti and myself, appear for the first time in the present volume. In preparing the articles for publication I am much indebted to Mrs. Lillian O'Toole, Mrs. Dianne Kanerva, and Mrs. Marguerite Shaw, for their extensive assistance.

This book grew out of previously published papers of mine composed over a period of years; they have been reworked (sometimes beyond recognition) so as to form a reasonably coherent whole. Part One treats of informative inference. I argue (Chapter 2) that the traditional principle of induction in its clearest formulation (that laws are confirmed by their positive cases) is clearly false. Other formulations in terms of the 'uniformity of nature' or the 'resemblance of the future to the past' seem to me hopelessly unclear. From a Bayesian point of view, 'learning from experience' goes by conditionalization (Bayes' rule). The traditional stum­ bling block for Bayesians has been to fmd objective probability inputs to conditionalize upon. Subjective Bayesians allow any probability inputs that do not violate the usual axioms of probability. Many subjectivists grant that this liberality seems prodigal but own themselves unable to think of additional constraints that might plausibly be imposed. To be sure, if we could agree on the correct probabilistic representation of 'ignorance' (or absence of pertinent data), then all probabilities obtained by applying Bayes' rule to an 'informationless' prior would be objective. But familiar contra­ dictions, like the Bertrand paradox, are thought to vitiate all attempts to objectify 'ignorance'. BuUding on the earlier work of Sir Harold Jeffreys, E. T. Jaynes, and the more recent work ofG. E. P. Box and G. E. Tiao, I have elected to bite this bullet. In Chapter 3, I develop and defend an objectivist Bayesian approach.

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11 original. Modifications which I introduced are radical and often far going. In my opinion the Polish text had two main drawbacks. It was overloaded with informal considerations and at the same time formal concepts included in some parts of the book were presented in a too complicated way. Of course one of the motives to revise it was also the fact that much time has passed since I finished writing the Polish version and obviously certain decisions and ideas contained in the first edition seem not quite relevant now. So it is not only the desire to make the exposition clearer but also the reasons of substantial nature which motivated writing a revised version. I do not think it desirable to bother the reader with a detailed discussion of all changes to which the Polish version was subjected and that is why I will confine myself to pointing out only the most significant ones. Explanations concerning logical and set-theoretical notions applied in the book have been shortened as much as possible, in the Polish version one whole chapter was devoted to the discussion of them.

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The Royal Institute of Philosophy has been sponsoring conferences in alter­ nate years since 1969. These have from the start been intended to be of interest to persons who are not philosophers by profession. They have mainly focused on interdisciplinary areas such as the philosophies of psychology, education and the social sciences. The volumes arising from these conferences have included discussions between philosophers and distinguished practitioners of other disciplines relevant to the chosen topic. Beginning with the 1979 conference on 'Law, Morality and Rights' and the 1981 conference on 'Space, Time and Causality' these volumes are now constituted as a series. It is hoped that this series will contribute to advancing philosophical understanding at the frontiers of philosophy and areas of interest to non-philosophers. It is hoped that it will do so by writing which reduces technicalities as much as the subject-matter permits. In this way the series is intended to demonstrate that philosophy can be clear and worthwhile in itself and at the same time relevant to the interests of lay people.

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The first six chapters of this volume present the author's 'predictive' or information theoretic' approach to statistical mechanics, in which the basic probability distributions over microstates are obtained as distributions of maximum entropy (Le. , as distributions that are most non-committal with regard to missing information among all those satisfying the macroscopically given constraints). There is then no need to make additional assumptions of ergodicity or metric transitivity; the theory proceeds entirely by inference from macroscopic measurements and the underlying dynamical assumptions. Moreover, the method of maximizing the entropy is completely general and applies, in particular, to irreversible processes as well as to reversible ones. The next three chapters provide a broader framework - at once Bayesian and objective - for maximum entropy inference. The basic principles of inference, including the usual axioms of probability, are seen to rest on nothing more than requirements of consistency, above all, the requirement that in two problems where we have the same information we must assign the same probabilities. Thus, statistical mechanics is viewed as a branch of a general theory of inference, and the latter as an extension of the ordinary logic of consistency. Those who are familiar with the literature of statistics and statistical mechanics will recognize in both of these steps a genuine 'scientific revolution' - a complete reversal of earlier conceptions - and one of no small significance.

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Are Western epistemology, metaphysics, methodology and the philosophy of science grounded only in men's distinctive understandings of themselves, others, and nature? Does this less than human understanding distort our models of reason and of scientific inquiry? In different ways, the papers in this collection explore the evidence for these increasingly reasonable and intriguing questions. They identify how it is distinctively masculine perspectives on masculine experience which have shaped the most fundamental and formal aspects of systematic thought in philosophy and the natural and social sciences - precisely the aspects of thought believed most gender-neutral. They show how these understandings ground Aristotle's biology and metaphysics; the very definition of the problems of philosophy in Plato, Descartes, Hobbes and Rousseau; the `adversary method' which is the paradigm of philosophic and scientific reasoning; principles of individuation in philosophical ontology and the philosophy of language; individualistic assumptions in psychology; functionalism in sociological and biological theory; evolutionary theory; the methodology of political science; Marxist political economy; and conceptions of `objective inquiry' in the social and natural sciences. These essays also begin to identify for us the distictive aspects of women's experience which can provide the resources needed for the creation of a truly human understanding.
Audience: The book will be of interest to those involved in epistemology, and philosophy of the natural and social sciences, as well as feminist scholars in philosophy. The work will also be of value for theorists, methodologists, and feminist scholars in the natural and social sciences.

In this book, I attempt to lay the axiomatic foundations of metaphysics by developing and applying a (formal) theory of abstract objects. The cornerstones include a principle which presents precise conditions under which there are abstract objects and a principle which says when apparently distinct such objects are in fact identical. The principles are constructed out of a basic set of primitive notions, which are identified at the end of the Introduction, just before the theorizing begins. The main reason for producing a theory which defines a logical space of abstract objects is that it may have a great deal of explanatory power. It is hoped that the data explained by means of the theory will be of interest to pure and applied metaphysicians, logicians and linguists, and pure and applied epistemologists. The ideas upon which the theory is based are not essentially new. They can be traced back to Alexius Meinong and his student, Ernst Mally, the two most influential members of a school of philosophers and psychologists working in Graz in the early part of the twentieth century. They investigated psychological, abstract and non-existent objects - a realm of objects which weren't being taken seriously by Anglo-American philoso­ phers in the Russell tradition. I first took the views of Meinong and Mally seriously in a course on metaphysics taught by Terence Parsons at the University of Massachusetts/Amherst in the Fall of 1978. Parsons had developed an axiomatic version of Meinong's naive theory of objects.

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The papers in this volume were presented at the colloquium "Reduktion in der Wissenschaft: Struktur, Beispiele, philos- ophische PrObleme", held in Bielefeld, West Germany, July 18- 21, 1983. Altogether eighteen talks were delivered at the symposium, and all appear here with the exception of Professor Ehlers' address. In addition, we are pleased to be able to include three papers by invited participants (Kamiah, Ludwig, Scheibe) who were unable to attend the meeting. The meeting itself brought together a sizeable group of logicians, philosophers and working scientists to discuss and debate the theme of reduction, one that occupies a central place in contemporary philosophy of science. The participants and contributors succeeded in opening up new directions in reduction studies and presenting fresh case studies of re- duction from many different areas of scientific practice. Their efforts will greatly enhance our understanding of reduction and, consequently, our grasp of the complex process of scien- tific change and the unity and growth of scientific knowledge.

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From the nineteen sixties onwards a branch of philosophy of science has come to development, called history-oriented philosophy of science. This development constitutes a reaction on the then prevailing logical empiricist conception of scientific knowledge. The latter was increasingly seen as suffering from insurmountable internal problems, like e. g. the problems with the particular "observational-theoretical distinction" on which it drew. In addition the logical empiricists' general approach was increasingly criticized for two external shortcomings. Firstly, the examples of scientific knowledge that the logical empiricists were focusing on were con­ sidered as too simplistic to be informative on the nature of real life science. Secondly, it was felt that the attention of these philosophers of science was restricted to the static aspects of scientific knowledge, while neglecting its developmental aspects. History-oriented philosophy of science has taken up the challenge implicit in the latter two criticisms, i. e. to develop accounts of science that would be more adequate for understanding the development 1 of real life science. One of the more successful products of this branch of philosophy of science is Lakatos's theory of scientific development, sometimes called the "methodology of scientific research programmes". This theory conceives science as consisting of so called research program­ mes developing in time, and competing with each other over the issue which one generates the best explan~tions of the phenomena that they address.

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In the last few years, there has been an enormous amount of activity in the study of analogy and metaphor. This is partly because of an interest of artificial intelligence researchers in simulating learning processes using analogy. It also arises from critical examinations of standard theories in the philosophy of language, with their inbuilt literal/meta­ phoric distinction. This volume consists of recent previously unpub­ lished work in this area, with a particular emphasis upon the role of analogies in reasoning and, more generally, their role in thought and language. The papers are contributed by philosophers, computer scientists, cognitive scientists and literary critics. Researchers in these fields whose focus is the study of analogy and metaphor will find much of interest in this volume. These essays can also serve as an introduction to some of the major approaches taken in the investigation of analogy. As noted, this volume brings together the work of researchers in several different disciplines. The various approaches taken with respect to the understanding of analogy tend to be rather different, however, the articles suggest a common conclusion. Analogy and metaphor pervade thought and language; their close investigation thus constitutes a valuable contribution to our understanding of persons. DAVID H. HELMAN Case Western Reserve University vii PART I CONCEPTUAL AND CATEGORICAL THEORIES OF ANALOGICAL UNDERSTANDING MARK TURNER CATEGORIES AND ANALOGIES I want to pursue the following claims: The way we categorize helps explain the way we recognize a statement as an analogy.

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